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This  paper analyzes  the  impact of geographic  diversiﬁcation  on bank  value by  employing a  data set com-
prising  the largest  banks  across the  world,  originating  from  both developed  and emerging  countries.  The
ﬁndings  suggest  that the  value  impact of international  diversiﬁcation  depends on  a bank’s  home  coun-
try:  higher  levels of diversiﬁcation  are  associated with  changes  in valuations  only  for  banks  originating
from  emerging  countries.  In  addition,  the locus of  destination of the  diversiﬁcation  efforts  matters  for
the  direction of effects: while  higher  levels  of intra-regional  diversiﬁcation  lead  to value  enhancement,
higher levels of  inter-regional  diversiﬁcation  seem  to induce  a  negative (but statistically less robust)
effect  on the  valuation  of emerging country  banks.
© 2018  The Authors.  Published by  Elsevier  B.V.  This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
From the mid-1990s and up until the onset of the global ﬁnancial
crisis, the internationalization of ﬁnancial institutions increased
dramatically (Claessens and van Horen, 2012b; Claessens, 2017).
The main contributing factors to this phenomenon were the liber-
alization and deregulation of ﬁnancial markets, the higher demand
for international ﬁnancial services arising from increased economic
and ﬁnancial integration, and the mitigation of geographic distance
effects on bank efﬁciency through technological improvements
(Berger et al., 2004).
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In recent years, though, the global banking sector has under-
gone a  major transformation, which accelerated in the wake of  the
global ﬁnancial crisis (Claessens and van Horen, 2014a; BIS, 2014;
Claessens, 2017; Lund et al., 2017). Banks from the Eurozone and
other developed economies retrenched from several foreign mar-
kets due to  lower margins on foreign business in countries where
they lacked scale and expertise (Lund et al., 2017). A substantial
regulatory overhaul subsequent to the crisis also created disincen-
tives for advanced country multinational banks to maintain large
and complex foreign operations. Banks from emerging and devel-
oping economies, on  the other hand, continued to expand abroad2 –
following the increasing dominance of their countries in the world
economy in  recent years – and became more regionally integrated.
As a  result, the current landscape of global banking encompasses a
larger variety of players, with banks from emerging markets hav-
ing an increasingly important role, and is  characterized by  a rising
trend towards greater regional activity. While existing studies have
examined this restructuring in global banking at  the industry-level,
the micro-level adjustments in the geographic diversiﬁcation of
global banks and the performance effects of the recent state of geo-
graphic diversiﬁcation have yet to be considered. Our  study aims
2 For instance, China’s four largest commercial banks (the largest banks in the
world based on  total assets at  the end 2016) quadrupled their share of foreign assets
between the years 2007 and 2016  (Lund et al., 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2018.04.003
1572-3089/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is  an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/).
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to ﬁll this gap using data from the largest banks across the world
over the period 2004–2013.
We  contribute to the literature in  three distinct ways. First, while
building on previous research on the bank internationalization-
performance relationship, this is the ﬁrst study – to the best of our
knowledge – that focuses on the conditionality of this relationship
upon the locus of destination of the diversiﬁcation efforts: regional
versus global. Recent advances in  the international business (IB)
literature note that multinational enterprises (MNEs) tend to be
more regional than global, in terms of the breadth and depth of
their market coverage, and that most of their international activ-
ity is conducted within their home regions (Rugman and Verbeke,
2004, 2007; Oh, 2009).3 The key insight here is  that a  region, deﬁned
in geographic terms, consists of countries with lower physical, eco-
nomic, cultural and institutional distance than at the global level
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2007; Arregle et al., 2009). The regional
focus of ﬁrms’ international activity can thus be explained by what
is referred to as ‘compounded distance’; that is, the need to man-
age various dimensions of distance simultaneously (Rugman et al.,
2011).4 These insights from the IB literature clearly suggest that, in
order to gain a better understanding of the performance implica-
tions of banks’ geographic diversiﬁcation, it is imperative to account
for the existence of regional boundaries. To this end, we employ
measures of international diversiﬁcation that have never been
explicitly used in the banking literature, and make a  distinction
between two types of geographic diversiﬁcation: intra-regional,
referring to diversiﬁcation within a  single region where the bank
is already present, and inter-regional, referring to  diversiﬁcation
across different regions (Qian et al., 2013).
Second, as opposed to  existing studies in international banking
which are heavily focused on advanced economies,5 our sam-
ple  includes banks originating from a  large number of countries
with diverse economic and institutional settings. This allows us to
uncover systematic differences in diversiﬁcation trends between
developed country banks (DC banks) and emerging country banks
(EC banks), and to  identify the underlying bank- and country-
speciﬁc characteristics affecting the diversiﬁcation-performance
relationship.
Third, our work adds to  the ongoing regionalization-versus-
globalization debate. Previous empirical studies on this debate
have failed to reach a  consensus, necessitating more research on
the geographic limits of international diversiﬁcation. Furthermore,
they have ignored the banking industry,6 despite its signiﬁcant
differences with the other industries. Banks’ internationalization
strategies, compared to  those of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, are subject to
additional complexities (Grant and Venzin, 2009)  and are highly
sensitive to institutional and regulatory proximities. In addition,
the performance of banks is  a  central issue affecting ﬁnancial sta-
bility, business cycle ﬂuctuations and economic growth (Berger and
Bouwman, 2017). We thus contribute to the aforementioned debate
3 García-Herrero and Vázquez (2013), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014) and
Claessens and van Horen (2014a) document an increasing regional focus (or home
bias)  in multinational banks’ assets  and operations. More recently, Duijm and
Schoenmaker (2017), using data from the 61 largest European banks, show that
banks’ foreign exposures are heavily concentrated in other European countries and
in  North America.
4 As also noted by Rugman et al. (2011), the  compounded distance is  insufﬁciently
captured in efforts to simply add or aggregate various types of distance, as these are
highly interdependent.
5 One important exception is  a  single-country study by  Berger et  al. (2010), which
analyses the performance effects of diversiﬁcation for Chinese banks along four
dimensions: loans, deposits, assets and (local) geography. The authors report diver-
siﬁcation discount for all  four dimensions, partly due  to inexperienced management
and  agency problems.
6 The only exception is  the study by Grosser (2005),  which describes the global-
ization strategies of the ten largest ﬁnancial service providers.
by looking at a  very important industry, where intra-regional set-
tings (associated with lower environmental complexity and similar
institutional and regulatory set-ups) can play a  crucial role.
Rather than pursuing an analysis of accounting measures of
performance, we investigate whether the diversiﬁcation activi-
ties conducted by banks inﬂuence their valuations, as captured by
Tobin’s Q (the ratio of a  bank’s market value to the replacement
value of its assets).7 Unlike accounting measures, such as return
and risk-proxy ratios, Tobin’s Q is  forward-looking and can bet-
ter capture the long term strategy and hence the capacity of  banks
to generate sustainable earnings (ECB, 2010). As outlined by Lang
and Stulz (1994),  since a  bank’s market value is  an estimate of the
present value of its future cash ﬂows, Tobin’s Q can be viewed
as a  measure of the contribution of the bank’s intangible assets
to  this value, including its management’s competence in  choosing
the right diversiﬁcation strategies. Furthermore, markets’ assess-
ment of value drivers, such as capitalization and size, may  change
over time depending on economic developments and regulatory
changes (Calomiris and Nissim, 2014; Chan-Lau et al., 2015).  Focus-
ing on Tobin’s Q  is  therefore especially appropriate for our research
context, since this measure incorporates markets’ capitalization of
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts which may  have changed dramatically since
the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis.
We start our empirical analysis by constructing measures of
intra-regional and inter-regional diversiﬁcation and documenting
the evolution of their average values over the period 2004–2013,
for both DC banks and EC banks. We  then investigate the impact
of these measures on Tobin’s Q at the bank-level, and test whether
the resulting effects vary with respect to home country attributes.
To capture the existence of rich dynamics in bank valuations
and correct for potential endogeneity problems stemming from
simultaneous relationships between bank value and diversiﬁcation
measures,8 we use a  dynamic econometric framework and employ
the system Generalized Method of Moments (system-GMM) esti-
mation technique. To make additional inferences about the impact
of diversiﬁcation on the overall bank performance and shed light
on the underlying mechanisms, we perform additional analyses:
(i) examine the impact of diversiﬁcation on proxies for proﬁtabil-
ity and risk; and, (ii) employ an ‘institutional’ deﬁnition of  regions.
Finally, to ensure robustness, we  use alternative proxies for bank
value and geographic diversiﬁcation, and alternative speciﬁcations
and samples.
Since the main objective of our study is to investigate how
bank valuations are affected by changes in  intra-regional and inter-
regional geographic diversiﬁcation, we consider large-sized banks
which tend to engage in cross-border activities. Small banks, in gen-
eral, are signiﬁcantly less likely to diversify across borders as they
face additional challenges and costs (Gulamhussen et al., 2014).
More importantly, as suggested in other studies (see, for example,
Berger et al., 2017)  and observed in our data, there is  not much
intertemporal variation in  a bank’s international status –  the vast
majority of banks remain either purely domestic or international
over time – and thus only large-sized banks can exhibit signif-
icant within-bank variation in geographic diversiﬁcation within
and across different regions. The focus on large (global) banks is
also important from a policy perspective, as these banks were the
main vehicles through which ﬁnancial systems globally became
more integrated before the global ﬁnancial crisis and the ones
mostly affected by the crisis and the subsequent regulatory over-
haul (Claessens and van Horen, 2014a; Claessens, 2017).
7 See Laeven and Levine (2007),  Deng and Elyasiani (2008) and Goetz et al. (2013)
for a similar approach.
8 Endogeneity may  arise when highly valued banks are more likely to diversify
regionally or globally; for instance, due to lower cost of external ﬁnance.
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Our two main ﬁndings can be listed as follows. First, higher levels
of geographic diversiﬁcation are  associated with changes in valu-
ations for EC banks, but not for DC banks. Second, the direction of
effects depends on the locus of destination of the diversiﬁcation
efforts: while higher levels of intra-regional diversiﬁcation lead to
value enhancement, higher levels of inter-regional diversiﬁcation
seem to induce a negative (but statistically unstable) effect on the
valuation of EC  banks. Our results also reveal potential explanations
of these ﬁndings. Banks originating from ECs  – being small, growing
and operating in economies which are less ﬁnancially and insti-
tutionally developed – can derive efﬁciency and learning beneﬁts
from pursuing a moderate expansion strategy that is concentrated
in their home regions, which, due to country similarities and spa-
tial proximities, entails low adaptation costs and risks. On  the other
hand, by engaging in  greater inter-regional diversiﬁcation, these
banks face extensive challenges and high risks (especially in peri-
ods of heightened ﬁnancial distress), which can eliminate or even
outweigh the high proﬁtability gains that can be drawn from having
access to an expanded multi-regional network.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature and develops the main hypotheses to be tested;
Section 3 presents the measures of intra-regional and inter-regional
diversiﬁcation, outlines the empirical strategy and describes the
data and the sampling procedure used; Section 4 reports the empir-
ical results and investigates their robustness; Section 5 provides a
discussion of the study’s conclusions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1. Background: theory and empirical evidence
Geographic diversiﬁcation can enhance the valuations of ﬁnan-
cial institutions through a  variety of channels. For instance, higher
levels of geographic diversiﬁcation may  reduce the exposure to
idiosyncratic local shocks (Diamond, 1984; Deng and Elyasiani,
2008; Goetz et al., 2016), enhance managerial efﬁciency (or x-
efﬁciency) and scale and scope economies (Berger and DeYoung,
2001), diversify sources of funding, and improve internal capital
markets (de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010; Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2012). However, geographic diversiﬁcation can also lead to  a
discount in the valuation of ﬁnancial institutions. Efﬁciency dis-
advantages may  occur when inferior management practices are
spread over a larger amount of resources or when transfers of man-
agerial skills to new geographic markets are not possible (Berger
and DeYoung, 2001). Difﬁculties associated with managing a  larger
and geographically diverse organization may  result in scale and
scope diseconomies. As  the physical distance between bank head-
quarters and local ofﬁces increases, monitoring the local economic
environment becomes more challenging and costly. Agency prob-
lems can be intensiﬁed as well, since geographic spread makes it
more difﬁcult for outsiders to monitor and exert effective corporate
control (Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Goetz et al., 2013).
From a cross-border perspective, geographic diversiﬁcation
provides ﬁnancial institutions with additional advantages and
challenges. Internalization theory claims that ﬁrms become multi-
national as a  response to various market failures. Speciﬁcally,
according to  this theory, internationalization takes place when
ﬁrms internalize their intermediate markets across national bound-
aries to combine and exploit ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages, such
as proprietary technology and superior managerial skills, and
country-speciﬁc advantages, such as access to a  large consumer
market or better institutional frameworks. International expan-
sion, however, also makes ﬁrms subject to  the ‘liability of
foreignness’ (LOF); that is, “all additional costs a  ﬁrm operating in
a  market overseas incurs that  a local ﬁrm would not incur” arising
mainly due to environmental unfamiliarity, cultural, political and
economic differences, and costs associated with spatial distance
(Zaheer, 1995,  p.343).
Under the internalization theory, the failure of market for
knowledge, in particular, creates the strongest incentives for orga-
nizing an internal market. Hence, the banking industry is expected
to be dominated by multinationals due to its skill-, knowledge-
and communication-intensive nature (Williams, 1997). Financial
services ﬁrms, however, compared to industrial multinationals,
experience additional complexities in  their internationalization
strategies due to the information intensity and institutional sensi-
tivity of the industry, and the difﬁculties in reconciling the strategic
requirements of diverse products and national markets. Geographic
and cultural distance between headquarters and local branches
makes the collection of soft information and its transmission within
the ﬁnancial organizations harder (Stein, 2002; Mian, 2006). Man-
agement and corporate governance problems in  global banks tend
to  be more pronounced due to their larger size and higher organiza-
tional complexity.9 At the same time, differences in regulations and
customer demand characteristics across national markets increase
local market adaptation needs which, in  turn, raise transaction
costs and limit exploitation of cross-border economies of scope. As
a result, transferring competitive advantages (based on organiza-
tional capabilities and resources) from home base to  foreign units
becomes the primary source of internationalization gains (Grant
and Venzin, 2009).  Along these lines, banks’ cross-border location
decisions are argued to  be inﬂuenced by the geographic, cul-
tural and institutional proximities (in addition to economic links)
between the source and the host countries, as these reﬂect infor-
mational problems and the learning costs of dealing with different
set-ups across countries (Galindo et al., 2003; Buch and DeLong,
2004; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005; Claessens and van Horen, 2014b;
Duijm and Schoenmaker, 2017).
Acknowledging that expanding into foreign markets is an
important diversiﬁcation strategy for banks, a  large body of  litera-
ture has offered insights into the motivations and the performance
gains of internationalization. Enhanced portfolio diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts, opportunities for regulatory and tax arbitrage, access to
markets with better growth prospects and higher proﬁt margins,
and internalization of existing bank-client relationships or the
so-called ‘follow the customer effects’ are some of the reasons pro-
vided to  explain higher levels of internationalization (Focarelli and
Pozzolo, 2005; Magri et al., 2005; Karolyi and Taboada, 2015; Merz
et al., 2017).
In this context, a particular line of analysis focuses on test-
ing the LOF in global banking. Miller and Parkhe (2002) ﬁnd that
foreign-owned banks are less x-efﬁcient than host country banks,
and that a bank’s home environment has a  strong impact on
its efﬁciency abroad – as suggested by the national competitive
advantage perspective. Berger et al. (2000),  on the other hand,
provide evidence in  favor of a  ‘limited form’ of the global advan-
tage hypothesis. According to  this variant, some foreign banks can
overcome distance-related organizational diseconomies and other
cross-border disadvantages and achieve better efﬁciency com-
pared to domestic banks, due to favorable home-country market,
regulatory and supervisory conditions. Consistent with this argu-
ment, Lensink et al.  (2008) ﬁnd that greater institutional similarity
between the home and the host country can moderate the other-
wise negative effect of foreign ownership on efﬁciency. Claessens
and van Horen (2012a),  in  contrast, report that foreign-owned
9 Governance of ﬁnancial institutions can  be more challenging than that of non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms due to their opacity and high leverage; regulations resulting in an
ineffective market for corporate control; and moral hazard problems associated with
deposit insurance (Levine, 2004; Mülbert, 2010).
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banks in developing countries are  more efﬁcient when they origi-
nate from a high income country and when regulations in the host
country are relatively weak. The conditionality of the cross-border
diversiﬁcation effects upon home and host country attributes is  also
emphasized in studies employing wider performance measures.
García-Herrero and Vázquez (2013),  for instance, using evidence
from the largest international banks in developed countries, show
that risk-adjusted returns increase when the share of assets allo-
cated to foreign subsidiaries in emerging countries increases, and
that these gains are lower when the subsidiaries are concentrated
in speciﬁc geographic regions. Similarly, Gulamhussen et al. (2017),
using evidence from the pre-crisis years, report that the positive
effect of diversiﬁcation on Tobin’s Q  is stronger when banks diver-
sify into economically less developed countries, and prevails up to
the point where higher costs due to  higher organizational complex-
ity override beneﬁts.
Given that bank risk is  a  central issue regarding ﬁnancial sta-
bility, a particular stream of the literature focuses on the impact
of international diversiﬁcation on risk. Berger et al. (2017) develop
two alternative hypotheses on the bank internationalization–risk
relationship. The diversiﬁcation hypothesis states that interna-
tional banks may  have lower risks since they are better positioned
to diversify away country-speciﬁc risks. The market risk hypoth-
esis, conversely, suggests that the LOF, together with the foreign
exchange risk on foreign assets and other market speciﬁc con-
ditions (such as political and economic instability), may  render
international banks more risky. The corresponding empirical evi-
dence offers a diverse picture and seems to depend on the sample
considered. Consistent with the dominance of the market risk
hypothesis over the diversiﬁcation hypothesis, Berger et al. (2017)
report a positive relationship between internationalization and risk
for US commercial banks; and similar evidence is  provided by
Gulamhussen et al. (2014) for a cross-country sample of commer-
cial banks. The existence of agency problems is possibly, according
to both studies, the driving force behind their ﬁndings. In contrast,
Buch et al. (2013) show that  international banks headquartered in
Germany are not riskier than domestic banks, and that the degree
of diversiﬁcation, rather than the scale of foreign assets, matters for
risk. Likewise, Fang and van Lelyveld (2014),  employing data from
the largest 49 multinational banking groups, report substantial
credit risk diversiﬁcation effects, especially when banking groups
located in OECD countries diversify into non-OECD countries. More
recently, Duijm and Schoenmaker (2017), focusing on the 61 largest
European banks, ﬁnd evidence that international diversiﬁcation
reduces insolvency risk and income volatility, and that such diver-
siﬁcation beneﬁts are stronger when banks diversify into countries
with dissimilar economic and ﬁnancial conditions.
The impact of international diversiﬁcation on bank performance
might be different during periods of ﬁnancial instability. Global
banks may  have a  relatively lower exposure to balance sheet shocks
due  to their diversiﬁed funding bases and customer pools, and
the existence of  internal capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2012). At the same time, though, they may  have a  relatively higher
reliance on wholesale funding, which may  put them at a  disadvan-
tage during periods of heightened ﬁnancial volatility (de Haas and
van Lelyveld, 2014). In this context, Berger et al. (2017) ﬁnd that
the positive impact of internationalization on bank risk is  stronger
for US commercial banks during ﬁnancial crisis periods.
As the above discussion suggests, the ﬁndings on the relation-
ship between international diversiﬁcation and bank performance
are still inconclusive. Nevertheless, the existing studies highlight:
ﬁrst, the importance of simultaneously accounting for all potential
gains and costs arising from pursuing a  regionally-focused or  oth-
erwise strategy; and second, the heterogeneity of diversiﬁcation
effects across banks headquartered in  countries with different lev-
els of ﬁnancial and institutional development. In the next section,
we develop the two hypotheses we aim to test.
2.2. Hypotheses development
2.2.1. Intra-regional versus inter-regional geographic
diversification
The observed regional nature of multinational enterprises in
their sales and asset dispersions (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004, 2007;
Oh, 2009), as well as the increasing regional focus (or home bias)
in multinational banks’ assets and operations (García-Herrero and
Vázquez, 2013; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2014; Claessens and van
Horen, 2014a), imply that prohibitive barriers to full globaliza-
tion may  still exist. According to Rugman and Verbeke (2005),  an
MNE’s tendency for regional concentration has transaction cost-
related origins. A broader geographic scope is considered to  be
costly, since each foreign location requires location-speciﬁc com-
plementary investments to blend ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages with
location advantages abroad. The associated challenges, however,
become ‘compounded’ when distance (along different dimensions)
increases and regional boundaries can serve as cut-off points sep-
arating lower-distance environments from higher-distance ones
(Rugman et al., 2011).  Arguably, then, intra-regional diversiﬁca-
tion confers efﬁciency beneﬁts, since knowledge and experience
of one country can be applied to other countries within the same
region, which share similarities in  terms of geography, economics,
institutions and politics (Qian et al., 2010; Banalieva et al., 2012).
Expanding into less proximate and dissimilar markets, on the
other hand, increases the complexity and diversity of operations
and necessitates higher location-speciﬁc investments. Hence, while
inter-regional diversiﬁcation helps ﬁrms maximise market oppor-
tunities by improving strategic ﬂexibility due to access to  a  wider
multinational network, it exposes them to the liability of  regional
foreignness which reduces efﬁciency and increases risks (Qian et al.,
2010, 2013; Banalieva et al., 2012).
In  sum, these arguments outline the substantial distance dis-
continuities at the region boundary, and suggest that the locus of
destination of the diversiﬁcation activities (intra-regional versus
inter-regional) must be carefully considered when investigating
the performance effects of geographic diversiﬁcation. Indeed, fail-
ure to do so may  be  a plausible reason for the mixed results reported
in the IB literature (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).10
As  discussed in  Section 2.1, when multinational banks con-
centrate their activities in speciﬁc geographic regions, risk
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts may  be limited due to similar economic fun-
damentals and exposures to common risk factors within the regions
(García-Herrero and Vázquez, 2013; Fang and van Lelyveld, 2014).
At the same time, though, they enjoy efﬁciency gains and lower
market risks due to lower environmental complexity and lower
coordination and adaptation costs within similar regions. Consider-
ing that the ﬁnancial services industry is information-intensive and
institutionally sensitive, and that substantial differences in regula-
tions and demand characteristics across national markets exist, we
expect intra-regional diversiﬁcation beneﬁts (higher efﬁciency and
lower market risks) to dominate costs, in  the form of limited risk
diversiﬁcation effects. Inter-regional diversiﬁcation, conversely, is
expected to result in lower bank value overall, due to lower efﬁ-
ciency and higher market risks dominating risk diversiﬁcation and
strategic ﬂexibility beneﬁts. In other words, we  hypothesize as fol-
lows:
10 Verbeke and Asmussen (2016) argue that, in international strategy research, the
region  should be introduced as an explicit geographic level of analysis, in addition
to  the country- and the global-level.
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Hypothesis 1.  Bank value increases with intra-regional diversiﬁ-
cation and decreases with inter-regional diversiﬁcation.
2.2.2. Developed country banks versus emerging country banks
A number of studies have documented an upward trend in the
international expansion activities of EC banks, especially since the
onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis (see, among others, Claessens and
van Horen, 2014a; BIS, 2014). EC  banks are stated to have the same
motivations to exploit ownership and internalization advantages as
DC  banks, but at the same time, they are found to be smaller, present
in  fewer countries and with more regional focus. This may  suggest
that their location choices and performances are more sensitive
to the cultural, institutional and geographic proximity to target
countries (Van Horen, 2007; Petrou, 2007; BIS, 2014).
Recent theoretical frameworks on EC multinationals, though,
postulate that such ﬁrms expand internationally not only to exploit
their existing competitive advantages, but also to  access new mar-
kets, strategic assets and knowledge. By internationalizing, they
can upgrade their competitive advantages, compete more effec-
tively with global rivals, and avoid institutional voids and market
constraints at home (Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007). Con-
sequently, the international growth for EC banks can be more of
a competence-enhancing strategy than a  competence-exploiting
strategy, as stated by  the traditional accounts of bank internation-
alization (Mariotti and Piscitello, 2010).
In particular, by establishing a  limited international presence, EC
banks can obtain a  more competitive access to  ﬁnancial resources
and/or to intangibles (such as information or knowledge resources
and reputation beneﬁts), and, by  transferring these ﬁrm-speciﬁc
advantages back home, they can strengthen their domestic market
positions (Boehe, 2016). Furthermore, they may  have a compet-
itive advantage over DC banks in  other EC markets, due to  their
familiarity with similar (adverse) institutional settings, and in  mar-
kets which are culturally and geographically close to  their home
countries (Van Horen, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).11
At the same time, a  regionally concentrated activity may  allow EC
banks – which, as already mentioned, are typically smaller and with
less internationalization experience – to  learn about operating in
foreign markets, and thus improve their capabilities and interna-
tional competitiveness, without facing extensive challenges and
high risks. By operating in their home regions, for instance, they
may  achieve scale and scope economies faster (Rugman and Oh,
2010). As a result, the marginal beneﬁts that  can be  derived from
further intra-regional diversiﬁcation can be signiﬁcantly more pro-
nounced for EC banks than for DC banks.
The performance effects of inter-regional diversiﬁcation for
the two bank groups are expected to be different than those of
intra-regional diversiﬁcation. While EC banks can beneﬁt from
diversifying into far away and developed markets in  search of
strategic assets and capabilities, their ability to  compete with DC
banks in such markets and globally may  be limited; for instance,
due to more demanding regulatory requirements in these markets
and missing unique ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages (such as established
brands) which can compensate for the liability of regional foreign-
ness. As stressed by Claessens and van Horen (2014b), banks from
non-advanced countries may  not be able to handle the (informa-
tional) disadvantages of distance as well as banks from advanced
countries. Hence, the market risk effects associated with increased
inter-regional diversiﬁcation can be stronger for EC banks than for
DC banks.
11 Berger et al. (2001), looking at  the Argentinean banking system, ﬁnd  that foreign
banks headquartered in other South American countries are more likely to  lend to
informationally opaque small ﬁrms than other foreign-owned banks.
Given these considerations, we expect the valuations of DC
banks and EC banks to  be affected differently by their diversiﬁ-
cation activities, and that the overall impact for each bank group
to  be conditioned by the locus of destination of the diversiﬁcation
efforts. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The positive (negative) effect of intra-regional
(inter-regional) diversiﬁcation on bank value is  stronger for banks
originating from ECs  than for banks originating from DCs.
3. Empirical methodology
We now proceed to  test Hypotheses 1 and 2.  In this section,
we discuss our diversiﬁcation measures and their evolution over
time, describe our data and sampling procedure, and specify the
empirical model for carrying out the tests.
3.1. Alternative measures of international diversification
Two  of the most commonly used measures of internation-
alization in  the banking literature are international share and
international concentration (see García-Herrero and Vázquez, 2013;
Berger et al., 2017; Gulamhussen et al., 2014, 2017). Based on sub-
sidiary presence,12 international share can be computed as:
International shareit =
fnit
Nit
(1)
where fnit is the number of foreign subsidiaries and Nit is the total
number of subsidiaries of bank i in year t.  On the other hand,
international concentration can be computed as a transformed
Herﬁndahl index (Hit):
International concentrationit = 1 −  Hit = 1 −
J∑
j=1
(nijt
Nit
)2
(2)
where J  is  the total number of countries in which bank i has sub-
sidiaries, and nijt is the number of subsidiaries in  host country j in
year t.  Both measures vary in the interval [0, 1], with values close
to 0 indicating low geographic diversiﬁcation and values close to
1 indicating high geographic diversiﬁcation. The advantage of the
latter measure is that it takes into account both the number of  coun-
tries in  which a bank is  present and the share of subsidiaries in each
country, and thus it can better assess the geographic dispersion of
the bank’s operations.
The IB literature has proposed a wide range of ﬁrm-level inter-
nationalization measures that  explicitly take into account the locus
of diversiﬁcation activities. Aggarwal et al. (2011) develop a clas-
siﬁcation system for the degree of a  ﬁrm’s multinationality based
on the extent of geographic spread of operations and the degree of
exposure to each geographic unit, whereas Banalieva and Santoro
(2009) offer a ﬁner-grained classiﬁcation of a ﬁrm’s geographic ori-
entation that distinguishes between its local, regional, and global
geographic segments. Qian et al. (2010),  on  the other hand, deﬁne
total geographic diversiﬁcation as the sum of two  components:
intra-regional (diversiﬁcation across countries within a  region) and
inter-regional (diversiﬁcation across different regions). By look-
ing at the regional dimension, all these measures can sufﬁciently
12 We acknowledge that banks can undertake international activities in mainly
two ways: ﬁrst, by  setting up overseas branches and/or subsidiaries; and second,
by  operating directly from home. Unlike single country studies, most of the cross-
country studies on bank internationalization employ (count or asset size) foreign
subsidiary data due to  the fact that systematic bank-level data on banks’ foreign
branches are not available. Recent examples of empirical studies that employ inter-
national diversiﬁcation measures based on foreign subsidiary data – similar to  our
approach –  include Fang and van Lelyveld (2014) and Gulamhussen et al. (2014,
2017).
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capture variation in the internationalization activities based on
proximities to host countries. As  pointed out by Rugman et al.
(2011), the high level of complexity involved in  integrating mul-
tiple types of distance into a simple internationalization measure
outlines the importance of using the region as an explicit unit of
analysis.
Following Qian et al. (2010) approach, we construct subsidiary
presence-based measures of intra-regional and inter-regional
diversiﬁcation, drawing regional boundaries according to six
continent-based regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central
America, Oceania and South America. A continent-based regional
classiﬁcation is preferable to other systems, such as using the broad
‘triad’ markets of NAFTA, the European Union and Asia as in  Rugman
and Verbeke (2004),  for two reasons: ﬁrst, it encompasses all the
countries in the world; and second, it does not change over time  as
the regions are deﬁned along geographic rather than political lines.
These attributes are critical for our analysis since we  consider banks
from many countries across the world, including banks headquar-
tered or having subsidiaries in  non-triad countries, and focus on
exploiting time-series variation in their diversiﬁcation strategies
within and across regions which remain the same over time.
Speciﬁcally, we calculate inter-regional diversiﬁcation (‘INTER’)
as:
INTERit =
M∑
m=1
simt ln(
1
simt
),
where simt =
nimt
Nit
(3)
M is the number of regions in which bank i has subsidiaries in  year
t, nimt is the number of subsidiaries in  region m in year t, and simt
is  the proportion of the mth region to the bank’s total number of
subsidiaries in all regions in year t (Nit). Similarly, we  calculate
intra-regional diversiﬁcation (‘INTRA’) as:
INTRAit =
M∑
m=1
simt ×
⎡
⎣ J∑
j=1
wijmt ln
(
1
wijmt
)⎤⎦
︸  ︷︷ ︸
INTRAimt
,
where wijmt =
nijmt
Nimt
(4)
nijmt is the number of subsidiaries in host country j of region m in
year t, and wijmt is the proportion of the number of subsidiaries in
the jth country to the total number of subsidiaries in the mth region
in year t (Nimt).  In other words, INTRAit is the weighted average
of the corresponding regional-level entropy values INTRAimt, the
weight being previously deﬁned as simt. We also calculate a  mod-
iﬁed intra-regional diversiﬁcation measure, ‘INTRA-Home’, which
accounts for subsidiary presence in  the home regions only (simt = 0
if the mth region is not the home region). This allows us to test
whether the relationship between ‘INTRA’ and bank value is driven
by diversiﬁcation within the home region, where the parent banks
have the least LOF.
Qian et al. (2010) measures capture a  bank’s degree of geo-
graphic diversiﬁcation not  only in  terms of breadth (number of
foreign countries and foreign regions), but also in terms of depth
(the relative importance of each foreign country and each foreign
region) – see also Oh (2009) and Oh  et al. (2015).  As such, ‘INTRA’,
‘INTER’ and ‘TOTAL’ (the sum of ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’) are our  pre-
ferred measures for testing the hypotheses of Section 2.2.  However,
as a means to address issues related to robustness, we also consider
two versions of the Herﬁndahl-type measure: the ﬁrst captures
global-level concentration as in Eq.  (2) (‘International Concentra-
tion’) and the second captures concentration within the region in
which the parent bank is  headquartered (‘Regional Concentration’).
3.2. Bank value model specification
To test Hypothesis 1,  we employ an empirical speciﬁcation that
builds on the work of Laeven and Levine (2007),  Caprio et al. (2007),
Deng and Elyasiani (2008) and Gulamhussen et al. (2017), and takes
the following form:
Q int =  ˛Qint −1 + ˇ‘ID’int + Xint + ıYnt + n + t + uint (M.1)
where Q  is  the Tobin’s Q, calculated as
Q  =
Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Assets − Book Value of Equity
Book Value of Assets
,
‘ID’ ∈ {‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’, ‘INTER’} is  a  measure of international
diversiﬁcation, as deﬁned in  Section 3.1; X is  a vector of bank-level
control variables; Y is a  vector of country-level control variables; i,
n, t index bank, country, and time, respectively; n and t represent
country-speciﬁc13 and year-speciﬁc effects, respectively; and u is
an i.  i. d error term.
Vector X contains a  broad range of bank-speciﬁc traits related
to bank value commonly used in  previous studies. Speciﬁcally,
it includes: (i) non-interest income to total operating income
(‘Income Diversity’) to account for differences in  the diversity of
ﬁnancial activities that may  affect bank risk, margins and value
(Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Goetz et al., 2013); (ii) total equity
to total assets (‘Capitalization’) to  account for the interactions
between capitalization levels and bank value, and as an indirect
proxy for bank risk (Deng and Elyasiani, 2008); (iii) cost to income
(‘Operational Inefﬁciency’) calculated as total operating expenses
to  total operating income (Caprio et al., 2007); (iv) non-performing
loans to  gross loans (‘NPL’) as a  proxy for loan quality and portfo-
lio  risk (Berger et al., 2009); and, (v) bank size measured by binary
variables that group banks into total asset quartiles, calculated sep-
arately for each region to account for size-level differences across
regions.
On the other hand, vector Y includes the GDP growth rate
(‘Growth’) and the inﬂation rate (‘Inﬂation’) as proxies of macroe-
conomic ﬂuctuations and institutional effects in the home country
of the parent bank (Demirgüc¸ -Kunt and Huizinga, 2010), which are
expected to inﬂuence not only a bank’s market value, but  also its
capacity to  diversify geographically.
The previous period’s Tobin’s Q  is  included among the explana-
tory variables to  capture persistence over time. Within this dynamic
framework, ˇ is  the short-run coefﬁcient, measuring the immediate
(within the year) response of Tobin’s Q to  changes in the diversiﬁ-
cation measures. The long-run (or steady-state) response of Tobin’s
Q to changes in the diversiﬁcation measures can be calculated as
ˇ/(1 − ˛), where |˛| is the portion of the short-run adjustment that
is translated to the next year.
To test Hypothesis 2,  we re-estimate model (M.1) with ‘ID’
replaced by the interaction terms ‘ID * EC’ and ‘ID *  DC’, where ‘EC’
and ‘DC’ (1 −  ‘EC’) are  binary variables coding banks headquartered
in ECs  and DCs, respectively.14 In this way, it is possible to estimate
the impact of intra-regional, inter-regional and total diversiﬁca-
tion on bank value conditional on the origin of the parent bank
(headquartered in DCs versus ECs).
Furthermore, to  examine which bank- and country-level char-
acteristics are  driving the (potentially) different effects between EC
13 The model includes country dummies for countries with three or more banks
and  thus sufﬁcient number of bank-year observations.
14 Our DC group includes countries that are  classiﬁed as ‘advanced economies’ by
the World Economic Outlook Database (October 2014 Edition), while our EC group
includes the remaining countries.
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Table  1
Variable description and data sources.
Description and Source
Dependent variables
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of
assets. BankScope
Return on Assets (ROA) Ratio of net income to  total assets. BankScope
Z-score (log) Return on  assets plus equity to assets, divided by  the standard deviation of return on  assets. BankScope &  OC
Independent variables
Income Diversity Ratio of non-interest income to total operating income. BankScope
Capitalization Ratio of total equity to total assets. BankScope
Operational Inefﬁciency Ratio of total operating expenses to total operating income. BankScope
NPL  Ratio of non-performing loans to  gross loans. BankScope
Assets Growth Growth rate of total assets. BankScope
Size  dummies Binary variables that group banks into total asset quartiles. BankScope
Age dummies Binary variables that group banks into age (number of years since establishment) quartiles. BankScope
GDP  Growth GDP growth rate. WDI
Inﬂation Inﬂation rate. WDI
TOTAL Entropy measure of total diversiﬁcation (sum of INTRA and INTER). BankScope &  OC
INTRA  Entropy measure of intra-regional diversiﬁcation (diversiﬁcation across countries within each geographic region).
BankScope & OC
INTER Entropy measure of inter-regional diversiﬁcation (diversiﬁcation across different geographic regions). BankScope &  OC
INTRA-Home Entropy measure of diversiﬁcation across countries within the geographic region in which the parent bank is
headquartered. BankScope &  OC
International Concentration 1 minus a Herﬁndahl index capturing concentration at the global level. BankScope &  OC
Regional Concentration 1 minus a Herﬁndahl index capturing concentration within the geographic region in which the parent bank is
headquartered. BankScope &  OC
Geographic Distance (log) Weighted average of the  geographic distance (capital city to  capital city distance in kilometers) between the home
country of the parent bank and the countries of residence of its  subsidiaries. CEPII & OC
Language Distance 1 minus the weighted average of the language proximity (CEPII common language index) between the  home country
of  the parent bank and the countries of residence of its  subsidiaries. CEPII &  OC
Institutional Distance Weighted average of the  institutional distance (difference in the WGI  institutional development score) between the
home country of the parent bank and the countries of residence of its  subsidiaries. WGI  &  OC
Regulatory Distance Weighted average of the  regulatory distance (difference in the WGI  regulatory quality score) between the home
country of the parent bank and the countries of residence of its  subsidiaries. WGI  & OC
Intra-institutional Dispersion Dispersion within a group of institutionally similar countries. WGI  &  OC
Inter-institutional Dispersion Dispersion across groups of institutionally different countries. WGI  &  OC
Agem (log) The median value of bank-level yearly observations of the number of years since establishment. BankScope
Sizem (log) The median value of bank-level yearly observations of total assets in billions of US dollars. BankScope
Financial Developmentm (log) The median value of country-level yearly observations of domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP. WDI
Institutional Developmentm
(log)
The median value of country-level yearly observations of the institutional development score; that is, the average
standardized score (percentile rank) of the six WGI  items: voice and accountability, political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. WGI
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators; OC: Own Calculations; CEPII: CEPII’s GeoDist Database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011); WGI:  World Bank’s World Governance
Indicators.
banks and DC banks, we implement additional tests based on the
following extension of the baseline model:
Q int = ˛Qint  −1 + ˇ1‘ID’int + ˇ2‘ID’int ∗ (Wm)in
+ Xsint + ıYnt +  Win + t + uint (M.2)
where Wm ∈ {‘Age’m, ‘Size’m, ‘Financial Development’m,  ‘Institu-
tional Development’m}, measured in logarithms, with the subscript
m representing the median value of yearly observations over the
sample period; W is a vector that includes all four Wm variables;
and, Xs is a sub-vector of X which contains the same variables as
X apart from the dummies for bank size. Estimating this equation
separately for each Wm and comparing the estimated coefﬁcients
ˇ1 and ˇ2 allows us to examine whether the diversiﬁcation effects
on bank value are different for older, more experienced banks, for
larger banks, as well as for banks that operate in  more ﬁnancially
and institutionally developed markets.
We estimate models (M.1) and (M.2) using the system-GMM
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  This estimator is
designed for short, wide panels (small T, large N), and to ﬁt linear
models with one dynamic dependent variable, additional controls
and ﬁxed effects, and hence, it is appropriate for our data and
model. In addition, it corrects for the endogeneity of potentially
endogenous explanatory variables. By combining equations in  ﬁrst
differences with equations in  levels, the system-GMM estimator
uses lagged levels as instruments for ﬁrst differencing equations
and lagged differences as instruments for level equations. In our
estimations, we treat the international diversiﬁcation measures
and the bank-level control variables as endogenous.15 To improve
the precision of the two-step estimators for hypothesis testing, we
apply the “Windmeijer ﬁnite-sample correction” to  the reported
standard errors. Furthermore, to  reduce the risk of instrument pro-
liferation and make sure that the number of instruments does
not exceed the number of groups, we  collapse the instrument
set using the procedure described in  Roodman (2009). The con-
sistency of the system-GMM estimator depends on the condition
of no second-order serial correlation and the validity of instru-
ments. To make sure that these conditions are met, we  perform two
tests: the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation of
the differenced residuals, and the Hansen test for over-identifying
restrictions. In a  robustness check, we  also test the sensitivity our
results to  alternative estimation techniques using a  bank ﬁxed
effects framework.
15 Speciﬁcally, the instruments used are lagged levels of the dependent variable
and the endogenous covariates for the ﬁrst differencing equations, and lagged
differences of these variables for the level equations. The  exogenous covariates
(country-level control, year and size dummy variables) are instrumented by them-
selves in the level equations and by  ﬁrst differences in the ﬁrst differencing
equations.
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Table 1 provides an overview of the variables included in mod-
els (M.1) and (M.2), and speciﬁes the data sources. Descriptive
statistics for the main regression variables are given in Table A.1,
while the cross-correlation matrix for these variables is  displayed
in Table A.2.
3.3. Data, sampling procedure and sample characteristics
Country-level data are collected from three main sources: the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), the World
Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), and the CEPII’s GeoDist
Database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Bank-level data are  retrieved
from two commercial databases provided by Bureau van Dijk:
BankScope and Zephyr. To assemble our dataset, we  ﬁrst extract
yearly accounting data16 over the period 2004–2013 on all publicly
listed banks in BankScope with total assets exceeding US$50 mil-
lion. We  include commercial, savings, mortgage and cooperative
banks, and holding companies and exclude investment and state
banks, and non-bank credit institutions, which have no compelling
reasons to internationalize their activities (Focarelli and Pozzolo,
2005). We also exclude banks headquartered in off-shore cen-
ters, such as Andorra, Bermuda, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Panama
and Saint Lucia, because they typically have less standard busi-
ness models (Gulamhussen et al., 2014). We  then match our initial
sample of parent banks with the yearly data of their signiﬁcant
subsidiaries; that is, subsidiaries that are at least 50% owned by the
parent and account for at least 0.1% of parent-bank assets in the
last available year. For each subsidiary (level 1), we check whether
it owns sub-subsidiaries (level 2) that are larger than 0.1% of the
ultimate bank owner (level 0)  in  the last available year.17 If it does,
we include the sub-subsidiaries as separate entities of the parent
bank. Since ownership data in BankScope reﬂects the latest sta-
tus, we use acquisition data from Zephyr to identify the ownership
changes that occurred during the sample period.18 More precisely,
for each subsidiary we trace back in  which year t it was  acquired
and include it in the structure of the parent bank from t +  1 onwards.
Similarly, for each parent bank we trace back which subsidiaries it
sold in year t and add these subsidiaries to  the structure of the
parent bank from t −  1 backwards.
This procedure results in a  sample of 160 parent banks19 head-
quartered in 56 countries (23 DC and 33 EC). The United States,
Japan and China have the highest number of bank-year observa-
tions in our sample, with 11%, 8% and 6% of the total number of
observations, respectively.20 Table A.3 in the Appendix provides an
overview of the top 30 most diversiﬁed parent banks in  our sample,
16 All extracted ﬁnancial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
17 To calculate these shares, we use consolidated ﬁnancial statements for parent
banks and unconsolidated ﬁnancial statements for subsidiaries.
18 For  each ‘completed’ acquisition deal, we extract information about the acquiror,
target and vendor, as well as the initial, acquired and ﬁnal stakes. We code as own-
ership change any deal where the acquiror ends up with 50% or more of the shares
of the target (the acquiror’s stake increases from less than 50% to  50% or more), as
the  acquiror has now control of the target.
19 The number of parent banks included in our regressions is  150 since for 10 banks
there are either missing values on the model variables or less than two  observations
on  the dependent variable.
20 Although our sampling procedure identiﬁes over 200 banks with headquarters
in  56 countries, the US banks account for 33 percent of the  original bank sample.
To ensure that our results are not driven by a  single country and that DC banks are
not over-represented in our sample, we  consider the 12 largest US banks for our
analysis. Additionally, the US  banking system is quite special in the sense that it is
dominated by non-diversiﬁed domestic banks (see  also Laeven and Levine, 2007),
and,  as pointed out by Fang and van  Lelyveld (2014), a  growing US bank is much
less  likely to become an international bank (compared, for example, to  a European
bank) due to the large size of the economy. It must be stressed that our baseline
results hold when we exclude all US  banks or when we exclude all banks with no
foreign subsidiaries in all years (see Section 4.4).
based on the maximum value of ‘TOTAL’. Even though two  EC banks
exhibit the highest values of total geographic diversiﬁcation in our
sample (Ecobank Transnational Incorporated in  Togo and Standard
Bank Group Limited in South Africa), the majority of banks in the
top 30 list are headquartered in DCs (21 banks). Furthermore, com-
paring the characteristics of banks in the top 30 list, we can see
that: (i) DC banks are, on average, larger and present in more coun-
tries compared to EC banks, and (ii) most of the DC banks are based
in  Europe, reﬂecting their relatively small home markets and the
European integration process which facilitated cross-border bank-
ing.
As a  preliminary assessment of the characteristics of the sam-
pled banks in terms of geographic orientation, we classify all
bank-year observations into different categories based on the
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s scheme (see Table 2). 254 (24%) are  clas-
siﬁed as domestic (D) and 289 (28%) as regional (R). Within the
regional category, nearly all the observations indicate operations in
less than one-third of the home-region countries (R1). The trans-
regional category (T) is the largest one in our sample, with 499
(48%) bank-year observations. The most common types in  the lat-
ter category are  T2 and T3, indicating operations in two and three
regions, respectively. No observations are categorized as type R3
or G, suggesting that no banks in our sample operate in more
than two-thirds of the home-region countries or have full global
reach. Splitting the sampled banks by origin conﬁrms that DC  banks
are spread more widely across different regions compared to EC
banks, providing support for our motivation to  develop Hypothesis
2.
3.4. Evolution of international diversification
In the following, we discuss the evolution of international diver-
siﬁcation between the years 2004 and 2013, using the measures
described in Section 3.1,  for both DC banks and EC banks.
Panels (a)  and (b) of Fig. 1 display the two  Herﬁndahl-type
indices of geographic concentration. Looking at ‘International Con-
centration’ (Panel (a)), a number of conclusions come to  front. First,
DC banks are  more internationally diversiﬁed than EC  banks, which
is not surprising given that EC  banks are relatively smaller and
late-comers to the internationalization stage. Second, the degree
of international diversiﬁcation starts decreasing with the onset of
the global ﬁnancial crisis for both groups of banks. Third, EC  banks
experience a sharper drop in geographic diversiﬁcation during the
years 2008 to  2011 compared to DC banks, but manage to recover
some of this reduction in the two  years that follow (2012 and
2013). Focusing now on ‘Regional Concentration’ (Panel (b)), we
can observe similar trends, even though the ﬂuctuations during
the crisis years seem to be less pronounced. Moreover, the gap in
geographic diversiﬁcation between the two  bank groups is  now
negligible (compared to  Panel (a)), suggesting that EC banks are
more dispersed within their home region than internationally.
Panels (c), (d) and (e) of Fig. 1 present the three geographic diver-
siﬁcation measures of ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ (our baseline
measures), whereas Panel (f)  displays the modiﬁed intra-regional
diversiﬁcation measure ‘INTRA-Home’. As  in  Panel (a), we can see
that the average level of total geographic diversiﬁcation (‘TOTAL’) of
DC banks is higher than that of EC banks, and this seems to be driven
by higher levels of diversiﬁcation both within regions (‘INTRA’) and
across regions (‘INTER’). Furthermore, all  three baseline measures
show an overall declining trend during the global ﬁnancial crisis
period (for both bank groups), with the most prominent downturn
being observed in inter-regional diversiﬁcation, starting in  2008
and ending in 2011. In the last couple of years, the two bank groups
seem to pursue different strategies: while EC banks become intra-
regionally and inter-regionally more diversiﬁed, DC banks engage
in slightly lower levels of diversiﬁcation. Finally, comparing the two
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Table  2
Classifying bank-year observations using Aggarwal et  al. (2011)’ system.
Symbol All  countries Developed countries Emerging countries
Count Perc Cum Perc Count Perc Cum Perc Count Perc Cum Perc
D 254 24.4 24.4 171 26.9 26.9 83 20.4 20.4
R1  283 27.2 51.5 151 23.8 50.7 132 32.4 52.8
R2  6 0.6 52.1 0 0.0 50.7 6 1.5 54.3
T2  357 34.3 86.4 183 28.8 79.5 174 42.8 97.1
T3  92  8.8 95.2 80 12.6 92.1 12 3.0 100.0
T4  31  3.0 98.2 31 4.9 97.0 0 0.0 100.0
T5  19  1.8 100.0 19 3.0 100.0 0 0.0 100.0
Total  1042 100.0 100.0 635 100.0 100.0 407 100.0 100.0
The table shows the number of bank-year observations if  there are no missing values on Tobin’s Q. D: Banks with subsidiary presence only within their home country in year
t;  R1: Banks with subsidiary presence only in the region in which they are headquartered in year t, and in less than one-third of the countries in that region; R2: Banks with
subsidiary presence only in the region in which they are headquartered in year t,  and in one-third to  two-thirds of the countries in that region; T2, T3, T4, and T5:  Banks with
subsidiary presence in two regions, three regions, four regions, and ﬁve  regions in year t,  respectively.
Fig. 1. The graphs show the evolution of ‘International Concentration’, ‘Regional Concentration’, ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’, ‘INTER’ and ‘INTRA-Home’ for developed countries (solid
lines)  and emerging countries (marked lines) over the sample period 2004–2013.
intra-regional diversiﬁcation measures, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTRA-Home’,
we can see that geographic diversiﬁcation within the home-region
accounts for almost all of the intra-regional diversiﬁcation.21
It is worth noting that DC banks and EC banks exhibit similar
within-bank variation in the diversiﬁcation measures; for instance,
the within-bank standard deviation of ‘TOTAL’ takes an average
value of 0.06 for both bank groups. To provide an example of
21 Formal t-tests conﬁrm that the average values of the  four diversiﬁcation mea-
sures (‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ and ‘INTRA-Home’) are statistically different
between DC banks and EC banks, and this applies for both the full sample period
(2004–2013) and the  crisis and post-crisis years (2007–2013).
such within-bank variation, we consider the evolution of the three
baseline diversiﬁcation measures for one of the parent banks in
our sample: Société Générale, a European multinational banking
and ﬁnancial services company headquartered in France. During
the second half of the 2000s, Société Générale grew its subsidiary
presence in  several European countries (Germany and Poland in
2006, Czech Republic and Croatia in 2007, and Russia in 2009),
while, in  2012, following the Greek debt crisis, it sold its only sub-
sidiary in  Greece. As  shown in Fig. 2,  these activities are reﬂected
in changes in the value of ‘INTRA’ in  the corresponding years. On
the other hand, Société Générale’s diversiﬁcation does not change
much over the sample period in  terms of inter-regional expansion:
the bank’s ‘INTER’ falls in 2005 due to the sale of its Argentinean
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Fig. 2. The graph shows the evolution of ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ for Société
Générale over the sample period 2004–2013.
subsidiary, and follows a  slightly declining trend up until 2009 due
to enhanced regional focus (and thus lower diversiﬁcation across
different regions). Since ‘INTRA’ exhibits a  larger variation com-
pared to ‘INTER’ over the sample period, the evolution of ‘TOTAL’
for Société Générale reﬂects mostly the changes in  the bank’s intra-
regional activities.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Basic findings
We  start our empirical analysis by estimating model (M.1) for
the full sample period 2004–2013 (see  columns (1) to (6) of  Table 3).
As  a  ﬁrst point, we can see that the coefﬁcient on the previous
year’s Tobin’s Q is  positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating
the persistence in  bank value over time and justifying the use of  a
dynamic model. Furthermore, we can see that Tobin’s Q  improves
during an economic upturn, as captured by the positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on ‘Growth’. Turning now to our
variables of interest, we ﬁnd evidence that higher levels of  total geo-
graphic diversiﬁcation are associated with changes in valuations for
EC banks, but not for DC banks: while the coefﬁcient on ‘TOTAL *  EC’
in  column (2) is  positive and statistically signiﬁcant, the coefﬁcient
on ‘TOTAL *  DC’ fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance. The latter can
explain the absence of diversiﬁcation-induced value changes in  col-
Table 3
Diversiﬁcation and value: basic results.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of Moments
Estimation period: 2004–2013 (baseline speciﬁcation) Estimation period: 2007–2013
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Dependent 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.21* 0.24** 0.19 0.26** 0.19 0.21
(3.32)  (4.02) (3.06) (3.38) (2.96) (2.87) (1.74) (2.33) (1.47) (2.33) (1.37) (1.57)
TOTAL  0.13 0.06
(0.81) (0.29)
INTRA  0.17 0.17
(1.04) (0.85)
INTER 0.00 −0.35
(0.01)  (1.32)
ID  * ECa 0.48** 0.54** −0.20 0.48** 0.54*** −0.55
(2.49) (2.22) (0.53) (2.23) (3.22) (1.62)
ID  * DCa −0.02 0.04 0.12 −0.04 −0.05  −0.42
(0.12)  (0.28) (0.41) (0.14) (0.29) (0.88)
Income  Diversity 0.01 0.05 −0.00 0.02 0.07 0.12 −0.02 −0.05 −0.02 −0.05  −0.06 −0.08
(0.09) (0.40) (0.01) (0.19) (0.50) (0.65) (0.18) (0.40) (0.22) (0.49) (0.43) (0.48)
Capitalization −0.25 −0.24 −0.34* −0.31 −0.31 −0.25 0.02 −0.03 −0.12 −0.08  −0.07 −0.03
(1.36)  (1.11) (1.94) (1.52) (1.49) (1.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.52) (0.34) (0.32) (0.11)
Operational Inefﬁciency −0.06 −0.08 −0.04  −0.05 −0.03 −0.08 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.01  0.03 −0.03
(0.78)  (0.87) (0.40) (0.53) (0.26) (0.98) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.28) (0.44)
NPL  −0.10 −0.13* −0.11 −0.17** −0.12 −0.11 −0.15* −0.19** −0.17** −0.21** −0.14* −0.14*
(1.35) (1.95) (1.38) (2.17) (1.61) (1.57) (1.79) (2.09) (2.05) (2.46) (1.89) (1.85)
GDP  Growth 0.21*** 0.15* 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.16** 0.11 0.19** 0.12 0.12 0.11
(3.01)  (1.93) (3.10) (2.71) (3.89) (3.50) (2.03) (1.28) (2.41) (1.53) (1.48) (1.23)
Inﬂation 0.08 0.03 0.13** 0.08 0.11 0.10* 0.07 0.03 0.13* 0.06 0.12 0.12
(1.32)  (0.41) (2.03) (1.36) (1.62) (1.71) (1.00) (0.52) (1.84) (1.23) (1.46) (1.59)
Long-run effect (ID) 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.22 −0.43
Long-run effect (ID * EC) 0.72** 0.80** −0.28 0.64** 0.72*** −0.69*
Long-run effect (ID * DC) −0.04 0.06 0.16 −0.05 −0.07  −0.53
Year,  country, size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number  of observations 900 900 900 900 900 900 771 771 771 771 771 771
Number  of banks 150 150 150 150 150 150 149 149 149 149 149 149
Number  of instruments 110 124 110 124 110 124 107 121 107 121 107 121
AR(2)  p-valueb 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.99 0.84 0.85 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.89 1.00 0.95
Hansen  p-valuec 0.35 0.44 0.53 0.45 0.29 0.47 0.26 0.46 0.16 0.25 0.13 0.27
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All coefﬁcients are standardised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a
one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The regression model is given in (M.1). The description of the regression variables is given in Table 1. Equations
estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard errors.
a In  columns with even numbers, the international diversiﬁcation variable ‘ID’ of the previous column is replaced by the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’
and  ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks headquartered in ECs and DCs, and ‘ID’ ∈ {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’}.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order two in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
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Table  4
Diversiﬁcation, proﬁtability and risk.
Method: System Generalized Method of Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
Dependent variable: ROA Dependent variable: Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Dependent 0.22** 0.21* 0.25** 0.23** 0.19** 0.23** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.84***
(2.03) (1.74) (2.36) (2.25) (2.14) (2.47) (20.93) (23.53) (21.67) (21.91) (18.65) (14.82)
TOTAL  0.20 −0.10
(1.05)  (1.64)
INTRA  0.07 −0.07
(0.37) (1.42)
INTER 0.30 −0.12
(1.53) (1.22)
ID  * ECa 0.45** 0.27* 0.50* −0.19*** −0.10** −0.29**
(2.03) (1.70) (1.87) (2.66) (1.96) (2.39)
ID  * DCa 0.08 0.07 0.08 −0.07  −0.07 −0.02
(0.40) (0.43) (0.23) (0.68) (0.89) (0.15)
Income Diversity −0.04 −0.00 −0.05 −0.06 0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
(0.37)  (0.00) (0.41) (0.42) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.44) (0.08) (0.28) (0.61)
Capitalization 0.36** 0.28* 0.31* 0.29* 0.38*** 0.32** 0.10* 0.13*** 0.10 0.10** 0.10* 0.16**
(2.46) (1.78) (1.91) (1.72) (2.96) (2.26) (1.87) (2.69) (1.51) (1.98) (1.91) (2.42)
Operational Inefﬁciency −0.50*** −0.40*** −0.47*** −0.44*** −0.48*** −0.44*** −0.13*** −0.12*** −0.12*** −0.14*** −0.10*** −0.09**
(5.18) (4.34) (4.20) (4.94) (5.85) (6.39) (3.32) (3.63) (2.66) (3.39) (2.75) (2.41)
NPL  −0.22*** −0.24*** −0.20*** −0.23*** −0.22*** −0.20*** −0.04 −0.02  −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.05
(2.80)  (3.61) (3.28) (3.89) (3.66) (3.41) (1.22) (0.67) (1.13) (0.70) (1.26) (1.58)
GDP  Growth 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.00 −0.02 −0.08*** −0.07** −0.07** −0.07** −0.06** −0.04
(0.28)  (0.23) (0.14) (0.12) (0.01) (0.29) (3.14) (2.57) (2.05) (2.36) (2.50) (1.58)
Inﬂation 0.09* 0.07 0.09* 0.09** 0.05* 0.03 −0.01 −0.01  −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.02
(1.77)  (1.39) (1.81) (2.04) (1.65) (0.67) (0.39) (0.38) (0.44) (0.78) (0.29) (1.35)
Long-run effect (ID) 0.25 0.09 0.37 −0.96* −0.68 −1.28*
Long-run effect (ID * EC) 0.57** 0.35* 0.65* −1.66** −1.02 −1.82***
Long-run effect (ID * DC) 0.10 0.09 0.10 −0.59 −0.71 −0.10
Year,  country, size  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 902 902 902 902 902 902 896 896 896 896 896 896
Number of banks 150 150 150 150 150 150 149 149 149 149 149 149
Number of instruments 112 126 112 126 112 126 112 126 112 126 112 126
AR(2) p-valueb 0.89 0.89 0.99 0.81 0.89 0.66 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.38 0.55
Hansen p-valuec 0.45 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.58 0.42 0.18 0.27 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.19
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All  coefﬁcients are  standardised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a
one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The regression model is given in (M.1) with the dependent variable ‘Tobin’s Q’  replaced by ‘ROA’ or ‘Z-score’. The
description of the regression variables is given in Table 1. Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard errors.
a In columns with even numbers, the  international diversiﬁcation variable ‘ID’  of the previous column is  replaced by the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’
and  ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks headquartered in ECs and DCs, and ‘ID’ ∈ {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’}.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order  two  in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 1% conﬁdence level.
umn  (1), where we consider the average diversiﬁcation effect for all
sampled banks. Finally, our results indicate that the observed rela-
tionship between total diversiﬁcation and bank value for EC  banks is
driven by geographic expansion within regions, rather than across
regions: the coefﬁcient on ‘INTRA * EC’ in column (4) is positive, sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, and larger in  size than that of ‘TOTAL * EC’ in
column (2), whereas the coefﬁcient on ‘INTER * EC’ in column (6) has
the opposite sign and fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance. Qualita-
tively, the results suggest that the long-run (or steady-state) value
of Tobin’s Q increases by  0.72 standard deviations when ‘TOTAL’
increases by 1 standard deviation, and by 0.80 standard deviations
when ‘INTRA’ increases by  1 standard deviation.
Do the reported relationships persist when we focus on the cri-
sis and post-crisis years, which are associated with heightened risk
in international ﬁnancial markets and costly regulatory reforms?
To answer this question, we  exclude the period 2004–2006 (15%
of our bank-year observations) and re-estimate the same regres-
sion set-up as in columns (1) to  (6). The corresponding estimates,
reported in columns (7) to (12) of Table 3,  support the main ﬁndings
of the previous paragraphs. However, the negative effect of ‘INTER’
is now relatively stronger, suggesting that a wider multi-regional
spread during crisis and post-crisis years is  value-destroying for EC
banks. More precisely, the long-run effect in column (12) implies
that a one-standard deviation increase in  ‘INTER’ reduces the value
of Tobin’s Q by 0.69 standard deviations.22 Concerning the control
variables, we can notice that, when we focus on the shorter period,
the coefﬁcient on ‘NPL’ is  statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels of signiﬁcance – with the negative sign indicating that, during
periods of ﬁnancial turmoil, poor asset quality becomes critically
important and leads to lower values of Tobin’s Q.
Overall, our ﬁndings broadly support the hypotheses devel-
oped in  Section 2.2.  In line with Hypothesis 1, the bank
diversiﬁcation–valuation relationship is conditioned by the locus
of destination of the diversiﬁcation efforts: intra-regional diver-
siﬁcation has a  positive effect and inter-regional diversiﬁcation a
negative (but statistically less robust) effect on Tobin’s Q. In  addi-
tion, in line with Hypothesis 2, these effects are signiﬁcant for banks
22 Note that this result is  mainly driven by  the  two years of the global ﬁnancial
crisis,  2007 and 2008: when we restrict the sample to include only the post-crisis
years 2009–2013, the estimated coefﬁcient on  ‘INTER * EC’ becomes much weaker,
both economically and statistically.
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Table  5
Diversiﬁcation and value: control for different types of bilateral distance.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Dependent 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.33***
(4.77) (3.96) (3.30) (4.10) (3.86) (3.08) (4.59) (4.09) (3.40) (4.40) (3.80) (3.58)
ID  * ECa 0.40** 0.43* −0.16 0.38* 0.39** −0.08 0.32 0.43* −0.11 0.53* 0.51** 0.14
(2.01) (1.94) (0.47) (1.92) (2.43) (0.30) (1.40) (1.87) (0.34) (1.87) (1.99) (0.40)
ID  * DCa −0.09 −0.02 0.12 −0.08 −0.04 0.12 −0.05 0.02 0.07 −0.10 −0.03 0.10
(0.43) (0.15) (0.50) (0.36) (0.29) (0.44) (0.29) (0.17) (0.25) (0.50) (0.18) (0.39)
Geographic Distance 0.08 0.03 0.16
(0.46) (0.14) (0.86)
Language Distance 0.14 0.09 0.04
(0.58) (0.44) (0.21)
Institutional Distance 0.08 −0.07  0.05
(0.29) (0.25) (0.22)
Regulatory Distance −0.14 −0.11 −0.12
(0.48) (0.41) (0.39)
Long-run effect (ID * EC) 0.65** 0.68** −0.25 0.58* 0.61*** −0.12 0.52 0.72** −0.16 0.85** 0.81** 0.20
Long-run effect (ID * DC) −0.15 −0.03 0.19 −0.12 −0.06 0.17 −0.08 0.04 0.10 −0.16 −0.04 0.15
Year,  country, size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number  of observations 900 900 900 900  900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
Number  of banks 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Number  of instruments 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
AR(2)  p-valueb 0.86 0.95 0.85 0.86 0.94 0.82 0.86 0.99 0.84 0.87 0.99 0.78
Hansen  p-valuec 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.41 0.24 0.27 0.48 0.21 0.28 0.37
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All coefﬁcients are standardised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a
one-standard deviation change in the  independent variable. The regression model is given in (M.1). The bank- and country-level variables of vectors X and Y are included in
the  regressions but are not displayed in this table. The description of the regression variables is  given in Table 1.  Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard
errors.
a For brevity and comparability, the columns show the results with the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’ and ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks
headquartered in ECs and DCs, and ‘ID’  ∈ {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’} (as given at the top of each column).
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order two in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
originating from ECs and insigniﬁcant for banks originating from
DCs.
To gain a more thorough understanding of the performance
implications of geographic diversiﬁcation, we further explore its
impact on bank proﬁtability and bank risk. Following Berger et al.
(2010)’s arguments, if higher values of geographic diversiﬁcation
lead to an increase in bank proﬁtability and a  decrease in bank risk,
then we can conclude that greater levels of diversiﬁcation improve
the overall bank performance. If, on the other hand, geographic
diversiﬁcation is found to be positively related to both bank prof-
itability and bank risk, then the overall performance effects are
ambiguous and would depend on what shareholders might per-
ceive as efﬁcient risk-return trade-off. To explore these arguments,
we estimate the same regression set-up as in  Table 3,  but we  now
use proxies for bank proﬁtability and bank risk as the dependent
variable; namely, ‘ROA’ (return on assets) and ‘Z-score’ (calculated
as the sum of return on assets and equity to assets ratio, scaled
by the standard deviation of return on assets over the sample
period).23
The results, presented in  Table 4,  indicate that higher val-
ues of total diversiﬁcation boost EC banks’ proﬁtability, but, at
the same time, translate into higher risk. Qualitatively, the long-
run coefﬁcients suggest that a  one-standard deviation increase in
‘TOTAL’ increases the value of ‘ROA’ by 0.57 standard deviations
and reduces the value of ‘Z-score’ by 1.66 standard deviations.
These highly pronounced effects seem to  be primarily driven by
23 Higher ‘Z-score’ indicates lower probability of default (lower risk). Since the
distribution of ‘Z-score’ is highly skewed, we use its  logarithm in our regressions.
inter-regional expansion: when EC banks diversify across differ-
ent regions, they enjoy much higher ‘ROA’ but are also exposed to
much lower values of ‘Z-score’ (see long-run effects in  columns
(6) and (12)), leading to ambiguous effects on performance. On
the other hand, intra-regional expansion seems to have an over-
all positive effect on performance: when EC banks follow a more
regionally concentrated strategy, they achieve a moderate increase
in proﬁtability without being penalized as much in terms of  risk
(see long-run effects in  columns (4) and (10)). These ﬁndings can
explain, to  some extent, the bank value effects of EC banks’ diversi-
ﬁcation activities found in Table 3 and discussed in  the previous
paragraphs. Notably, when we employ accounting measures of
performance, the explanatory power of our bank-level control vari-
ables improves. More precisely, as shown in  Table 4,  higher levels
of ‘Capitalization’ and lower values of ‘Operational Inefﬁciency’ and
‘NPL’ are generally associated with higher proﬁtability and lower
risk.
4.2. Direct metrics of distance and institutional dispersion
As  argued by Rugman et al. (2011) and noted in Section
3.1, regional boundaries represent a useful cut at separating
lower-distance intra-regional environments from higher-distance
inter-regional ones. Hence, although our diversiﬁcation measures
do not explicitly utilize a direct metric of bilateral distance (eco-
nomic, cultural, institutional, or merely geographic), they do  take
into account that inter-regional settings involve markets ‘far away’
from banks’ home regions. One concern that may arise here is
that the different bank value effects of ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ are not
driven by changes in the breath and depth of geographic diver-
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siﬁcation within regions and across regions, but are rather the
outcome of bilateral distance changes between the source and the
host countries; that is, regional boundaries do not actually matter.
To address this concern, we  examine whether our  results hold when
we augment the baseline speciﬁcation of Table 3  with direct met-
rics of distance; namely, ‘Geographic Distance’, ‘Language Distance’,
‘Institutional Distance’ and ‘Regulatory Distance’. Each indicator is
calculated as a  weighted average of the distance between the home
country of the parent bank and the countries of residence of its sub-
sidiaries, where the weight is the parent bank’s share of subsidiaries
in each country. For ‘Geographic Distance’ we use the logarithm of
bilateral (capital to capital city) distances in  kilometers, for ‘Insti-
tutional Distance’ we  use the bilateral differences in  institutional
development, while for ‘Regulatory Distance’ we use the bilateral
differences in regulatory quality.24 ‘Language Distance’ is  based on
the CEPII’s Common Language Index, re-scaled to reﬂect distance
instead of proximity between countries. Table 5 displays the corre-
sponding results, where, for brevity and comparability, we focus on
the interaction terms ‘ID *  EC’ and ‘ID  *  DC’. The added distance vari-
ables turn out to have little economic inﬂuence on the dependent
variable and fail to reach statistical signiﬁcance. More importantly,
the inferences on our diversiﬁcation measures do not change: once
again we ﬁnd that the value of EC banks responds positively to
increasing levels of intra-regional diversiﬁcation, which, in  turn,
produces an overall positive impact of ‘TOTAL’ on Tobin’s Q.
The failure to uncover strong relationships between bank value
and direct metrics of distance is consistent with the arguments of
Shenkar (2001) and Gupta et al. (2002).  According to these studies,
using continuous distance measures raises questions of linearity
and functional form by  implicitly assuming away discontinuities
and threshold effects. Country clusters, on the other hand, can be  a
more useful way to summarize cultural and institutional similari-
ties, as well trade and customer links, across countries. Following
these arguments, we employ an alternative deﬁnition of regions –
based on institutions – as a post hoc test. Since there is  no consen-
sus about how to  classify countries into institutional clusters, we
follow the approach of Asmussen and Goerzen (2013).  More pre-
cisely, we ﬁrst divide all the countries of the world into two groups:
those with an average institutional development score above the
median and those with an average institutional development score
below the median. We  then utilize these groups to construct two
new diversiﬁcation measures based on Eqs. (3) and (4); namely,
‘Intra-institutional Dispersion’ (dispersion within a  group of insti-
tutionally similar countries) and ‘Inter-institutional Dispersion’
(dispersion across groups of institutionally different countries).
Table 6 shows the results with ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ replaced by these
new diversiﬁcation measures. Overall, we  ﬁnd evidence that, for EC
banks, higher levels of intra-institutional dispersion lead to value
enhancement, while higher levels of inter-institutional dispersion
have no effect on value. This is  not so surprising if we take into
account that the two alternative deﬁnitions of regions are highly
correlated; that is, countries within a  geographic region are far
more likely to be institutionally similar to one another than those
in different geographic regions.25 At  the same time, the estimated
24 Data for institutional development and regulatory quality are obtained from
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) database, which has been
used  widely in related studies (see, for example, Claessens and van Horen, 2012a;
Asmussen and Goerzen, 2013). The  institutional development score is  calculated
as  the average standardized score (percentile rank) of the six  WGI  items: voice
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory qual-
ity,  rule of law, and control of corruption. The regulatory quality score is  simply the
standardized score of the fourth item.
25 Speciﬁcally, source and host countries within the same geographic region belong
to  the same institutional group in 73% of the cases in our sample, while the cor-
responding percentage for those in different geographic regions is 40%. Similar
Table 6
Diversiﬁcation and value: institutional dispersion.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of
Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Dependent 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28***
(3.01) (3.72) (3.05) (2.99)
Intra-institutional Dispersion 0.20
(1.17)
Inter-institutional Dispersion −0.04
(0.24)
* ECa 0.38** 0.01
(2.12) (0.04)
* DCa 0.04 −0.07
(0.17) (0.38)
Long-run effect ()  0.28 −0.06
Long-run effect (*  EC) 0.53** 0.01
Long-run effect (*  DC) 0.05 −0.10
Year, country, size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 900 900 900 900
Number of banks 150 150 150 150
Number of instruments 110 124 109 122
AR(2) p-valueb 0.88 0.90 0.83 0.78
Hansen p-valuec 0.43 0.49 0.20 0.33
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All coefﬁcients are standard-
ised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for
a  one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The  regression model
is  given in (M.1), with ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ replaced by ‘Intra-institutional Dispersion’
and ‘Inter-institutional Dispersion’. To calculate these measures, we divide all the
countries of the  world into two groups: those with an  average institutional develop-
ment score above the median, and those with an average institutional development
score  below the median. The  bank- and country-level variables of vectors X and Y are
included in the regressions but are not displayed in this table. Equations estimated
using Windmeijer WC-robust standard errors.
a In columns with even numbers, the institutional dispersion measure ‘’ of the
previous column is  replaced by  the interaction terms ‘*EC’ and ‘*DC’, where ‘EC’
and ‘DC’ are  binary variables coding banks headquartered in ECs and DCs, and ‘’ ∈
{‘Intra-institutional Dispersion’,‘Inter-institutional Dispersion’}.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order two in the
ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0:
over-identifying restrictions are valid.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
coefﬁcients in  Table 6 are economically less signiﬁcant than those
in Table 3, indicating that the institutional deﬁnition of regions does
not provide as good of a  test of the research question as does the
geographic deﬁnition of regions used in our baseline model.
In  sum, the results of Tables 5 and 6 point to  two  conclusions.
First, institutional similarity within regions is indeed an important
channel through which EC banks can beneﬁt from intra-regional
diversiﬁcation. Second, using the geographic region as a unit of
analysis can sufﬁciently capture the multiplicative performance
effects stemming from different types of distance (and country
links), which are not  independent of each other.
4.3. Variation across bank and country characteristics
As discussed in Section 2.2, EC banks may  not have the ﬁrm- and
country-speciﬁc advantages associated with internationalization
that DC banks do. To take a closer look at this issue, we  compare the
two bank groups in  our sample across four bank- and country-level
variables: ‘Age’m (number of years since establishment), ‘Size’m
(total assets in billions of US dollars), ‘Financial Development’m
(domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP), and ‘Institutional
correlations can  be observed when we  create groups based on language similarities
and regulatory quality closeness.
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Table  7
Developed country vs emerging country banks.
Variable DC banks EC banks t-test
Obs Mean Std dev Obs Mean Std dev Mean Diffa
Agem 83 81.00 81.37 77 43.48 38.82 37.52***
Sizem 83 548.80 644.02 77 37.88 61.82 510.92***
Financial Developmentm 83 139.36 41.17 77 65.37 41.82 73.99***
Institutional Developmentm 83 86.60 8.05 77 41.39 16.23 45.21***
Wm is the median value of yearly observations of W over the sample period 2004–2013, where W ∈  {‘Age’,‘Size’,‘Financial Development’,‘Institutional Development’}.  See
Table 1 for further information on  these variables. The values displayed in this  table are not in logs.
a Reports the difference in the mean values between DC and EC banks.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
Table 8
Diversiﬁcation and value: variation across bank and country characteristics.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of
Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
TOTAL INTRA INTER
(1) (2) (3)
Specification I
ID  * EC 0.46 0.76** −0.41
(1.21) (2.14) (1.31)
ID  * DC −0.01 −0.02 −0.14
(0.01) (0.13) (0.46)
Specification II
ID  1.45 1.13 1.25
(1.10) (1.21) (0.78)
ID  * Agem −0.33 −0.18 −0.38
(0.98) (1.01) (0.95)
Specification III
ID  0.97 6.68** −1.77
(0.27) (2.20) (1.34)
ID  * Sizem −0.08 −0.73** 0.17
(0.20) (2.22) (1.07)
Specification IV
ID  5.17 5.49* 1.10
(1.47) (1.96) (0.40)
ID  * Financial Developmentm −0.83 −0.89* −0.24
(1.43) (1.94) (0.53)
Specification V
ID  2.48 6.40** −1.61
(0.73) (2.12) (0.86)
ID  * Institutional Developmentm −0.28 −0.71** 0.17
(0.72) (2.06) (0.71)
Columns report long-run effects (|z|-statistics). All coefﬁcients are standardised and
display how many standard deviations the steady-state value of the dependent vari-
able changes for a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The
regression model is given in (M.2). Speciﬁcation I  shows the results with the interac-
tion  terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’ and ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks
headquartered in ECs and DCs,  and ‘ID’ ∈ {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’} (as given at  the
top  of each column). Speciﬁcations II-V show the results with the variable ‘ID’ and the
interaction term ‘ID* Wm ’, where Wm ∈ {‘Age’m ,  ‘Size’m , ‘Financial Development’m ,
‘Institutional Development’m}. See Table 1  for further information on these variables.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level.
Development’m (the WGI  institutional development score). We  can
discern that, on average, EC  banks are younger, smaller, and origi-
nate from countries with lower levels of ﬁnancial and institutional
development, and that the mean differences in these variables
between the two bank groups are very large and statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level (see Table 7). Do the results
reported in Table 3 change when we allow for variation in  bank
value with respect to bank and country characteristics? To answer
this question, we augment the baseline speciﬁcation (M.1) with the
aforementioned variables (in logarithms) and omit the size- and
country-speciﬁc effects. The long-run estimates, presented in Spec-
iﬁcation I of Table 8,  lead to the same overall conclusion: greater
intra-regional diversiﬁcation is  value-creating for EC banks.
The signiﬁcant differences in bank- and country-speciﬁc char-
acteristics between DC banks and EC banks raise also another
important question. Which of these characteristics are driving
the observed relationships between bank value and geographic
diversiﬁcation for the two  bank groups? We  thus take our anal-
ysis one step further and re-estimate the same regression set-up
with ‘ID * EC’ and ‘ID *  DC’ replaced by the interaction between ‘ID’
and Wm ∈ {‘Age’m, ‘Size’m, ‘Financial Development’m, ‘Institutional
Development’m};  that is,  we estimate model (M.2) separately for
each Wm.26 The results, displayed in  Speciﬁcations II–V of Table 8,
are in line with our previous ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
Tobin’s Q responds more positively to  increased intra-regional
diversiﬁcation when banks are smaller and originate from coun-
tries with lower values of ﬁnancial and institutional development,
with all  being characteristics of EC banks. We infer this from the
positive estimated long-run coefﬁcients of ‘ID’ in column (2) of
speciﬁcations III, IV  and V, together with the negative and signif-
icant estimated long-run coefﬁcients of ‘ID * Size’m,  ‘ID *  Financial
Development’m and ‘ID *  Institutional Development’m. It must be
stressed that, due to  high correlations between the four variables
under consideration, one has to be very cautious in prioritizing
and uncovering links among the different sources of variation in
the diversiﬁcation effects. Nevertheless, the analysis in  this section
clearly indicates that  a  binary distinction between EC banks and DC
banks can serve as a  crude measure that may  capture a  number of
these sources simultaneously.
4.4. Robustness tests
We perform various tests to  assess the robustness of  the key
ﬁndings, as discussed in Section 4.1. First, we check whether our
results hold when we use, as dependent variable, alternative prox-
ies of bank value; that  is, the ratio of the market value of equity to
the book value of equity, ‘MV-to-BV’ (columns (1)–(3) of  Table 9),
and the ratio of the market value of equity to total assets, ‘MV-
to-Assets’ (columns (4)–(6) of Table 9).27 Second, we test whether
our results become less pronounced when we replace ‘INTRA’ with
‘INTRA-Home’ (columns (7)–(9) of Table 9). Third, we examine
the sensitivity of our results when we adopt subsidiary asset-
based (instead of presence-based) measures of total, intra-regional,
and inter-regional geographic diversiﬁcation (columns (10)–(12) of
Table 9).28 Fourth, we include the growth rate of total assets, ‘Assets
26 Including all the interaction terms in  the same speciﬁcation generates a great
many instruments in the GMM  estimation and weakens the Hansen test of the
instruments’ joint  validity. In addition, it  leads to collinearity and identiﬁcation
problems, which affects the interpretability of the  estimated coefﬁcients.
27 The  ﬁrst measure has been employed in other studies (see, for example, Caprio
et  al., 2007),  whereas the second measure is  based on BankScope’s deﬁnition for
Tobin’s  Q.
28 The  asset-based measures are also constructed using Eqs. (3) and (4), but, in
this  case, incorporate information about the proportion of subsidiary assets instead
of the proportion of subsidiaries. Since for a  large number of subsidiaries in our
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Table  9
Diversiﬁcation and value: robustness tests.
Dependent variable: MV-to-BV (columns (1)–(3)), MV-to-Assets (columns (4)–(6)), Tobin’s Q (columns (7)–(12)). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Estimation period: 2004–2013
Dependent: ‘MV-to-BV’ Dependent: ‘MV-to-Assets’ Use ‘INTRA-Home’ Use asset-based ‘ID’
TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Dependent 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.28***
(3.41) (3.45) (3.56) (2.79) (2.79) (3.17) (3.81) (3.63) (2.87) (3.49) (3.60) (2.80)
ID  * ECa 0.31* 0.42** −0.48 0.38** 0.38* 0.13 0.47*** 0.56** −0.20 0.42*** 0.33** −0.12
(1.91)  (2.04) (0.99) (2.47) (1.91) (0.47) (2.58) (2.42) (0.53) (2.67) (2.20) (0.27)
ID  * DCa −0.23 −0.19 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.13
(1.02) (1.24) (0.23) (0.29) (0.58) (0.26) (0.19) (0.20) (0.41) (0.36) (0.65) (0.52)
Income Diversity 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 −0.03 0.06
(0.45) (0.58) (0.43) (0.34) (0.19) (0.61) (0.11) (0.02) (0.65) (0.12) (0.26) (0.41)
Capitalization −0.24 −0.28 −0.19 0.18 0.09 0.27* −0.24 −0.32 −0.25 −0.30 −0.30* −0.30
(1.15)  (1.38) (1.09) (1.05) (0.49) (1.66) (1.09) (1.40) (1.17) (1.64) (1.67) (1.19)
Operational Inefﬁciency −0.06 −0.07 −0.09 −0.01 0.03 −0.06 −0.09 −0.03 −0.08 −0.06 −0.04 −0.08
(0.75)  (0.81) (0.74) (0.08) (0.38) (0.89) (1.10) (0.34) (0.98) (0.74) (0.47) (0.81)
NPL  −0.15*** −0.19*** −0.15** −0.12** −0.13** −0.08 −0.13* −0.16** −0.11 −0.16* −0.17** −0.14*
(2.72) (2.83) (2.10) (2.07) (1.96) (1.51) (1.76) (2.07) (1.57) (1.93) (2.38) (1.88)
GDP  Growth 0.11 0.13* 0.19*** 0.11 0.15** 0.10* 0.18** 0.20** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.23***
(1.38) (1.85) (3.13) (1.61) (1.98) (1.80) (1.98) (2.58) (3.50) (2.74) (2.88) (3.72)
Inﬂation 0.02 0.04 0.12** 0.01 0.05 −0.00 0.04 0.08 0.10* 0.11* 0.12* 0.09
(0.52) (0.72) (2.02) (0.23) (0.93) (0.01) (0.53) (1.22) (1.71) (1.81) (1.86) (1.42)
Long-run effect (ID * EC) 0.43** 0.59** −0.68 0.54*** 0.54** 0.18 0.69*** 0.82** −0.28 0.63*** 0.48** −0.16
Long-run effect (ID * DC) −0.33 −0.27 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.18
Year,  country, size  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 900 900 900 865 865 865 900 900 900 900 900 900
Number of banks 150 150 150 147 147 147 150 150 150 150 150 150
Number of instruments 124 124 124 122 122 122 124 124 124 124 124 124
AR(2) p-valueb 0.80 0.91 0.89 0.69 0.83 0.54 0.88 0.96 0.85 1.00 0.99 0.83
Hansen p-valuec 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.34 0.22 0.47 0.50 0.32 0.46
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All  coefﬁcients are  standardised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a
one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The  regression model is given in (M.1). The  bank- and country-level variables of vectors X and Y are  included in
the  regressions but are not displayed in this table. The description of the regression variables is given in Table 1.  Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard
errors.
a For  brevity and comparability, the columns show the results with the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’ and ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks
headquartered in ECs and DCs, and ‘ID’ ∈ {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’} (as given at the top of each column). Equations in columns (1)–(3) have, as dependent variable, the ratio
of  the market value of equity to  the book value of equity (‘MV-to-BV’). Equations in columns (4)–(6) have, as dependent variable, the ratio of the market value of equity to
total assets (‘MV-to-Assets’). Equations in columns (7)–(9) replace ‘INTRA’ with ‘INTRA-Home’. Equations in columns (10)–(12) employ subsidiary asset-based (instead of
presence-based) ‘ID’ measures.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order  two  in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 1% conﬁdence level.
Growth’, and age dummies (binary variables that  group banks into
age quartiles) as additional control variables, and omit ‘Income
Diversity’ which is another form of diversiﬁcation (columns (1)–(9)
of Table 10). Fifth, we experiment by  re-deﬁning ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’
and ‘INTER’ to capture geographic diversiﬁcation within and across
ﬁve regions, instead of six (columns (10)–(12) of Table 10).29
Finally, we exclude the US banks, the Japanese banks and the
Chinese banks, which have the highest number of bank-year obser-
vations in our sample (columns (1)–(9) of Table 11). Overall, the
estimates obtained are broadly consistent with those reported
in the baseline speciﬁcation: intra-regional diversiﬁcation, and
particularly diversiﬁcation across the home-region countries, is
value-creating for EC banks, which leads to  an overall positive
impact of ‘TOTAL’ on Tobin’s Q.
As  noted in  Section 3.3,  a  number of bank-year observations
in  our sample are classiﬁed as domestic. To check robustness to
sample, the value of assets is  available for a limited number of years, we calculate
these measures using the median of each subsidiary’s assets over the sample period.
Therefore, while the asset-based measures take  into account the relative size of each
subsidiary, they do  not vary when a subsidiary becomes larger or smaller over time.
29 To do that, we merge ‘Asia’ and ‘Oceania’ into one region.
sample selection, in  that pure domestic banks are  perhaps dif-
ferent entities altogether, we exclude all banks with no foreign
subsidiaries in all years and focus on the diversiﬁcation effects of
international banks. As shown in columns (10)–(12) of  Table 11, the
estimated coefﬁcients are  marginally smaller in  absolute value, but
they retain their sign and level of statistical signiﬁcance, leading to
the same inferences.
We  also test whether our results persist when we  consider a
bank ﬁxed effects framework. In the context of a dynamic panel
data model as in  (M.1), the ﬁxed effects estimator is known to
be severely biased and inconsistent unless the time dimension is
large (Nickel, 1981). The time dimension in  our data set is  rela-
tively small (at  most 10 years) and, hence, the bias that results
from using a ﬁxed effects estimator is non-negligible. To address
this issue, we transform our model into ﬁrst differences (without
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable), which allows us to
obtain estimates of the immediate (within the year) effects. Taking
ﬁrst differences eliminates endogeneity from time-invariant unob-
served bank characteristics, but it does not  control for unobserved
bank-speciﬁc time trends in levels, which are likely to  be present
in EC banks. It is  thus sensible to estimate the ﬁrst-differencing
model with bank ﬁxed effects. Table 12 shows the results of this
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Table  10
Diversiﬁcation and value: robustness tests (continued).
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
Add  ‘Assets Growth’ Add age dummies Omit ‘Income Diversity’ Use ﬁve regions
TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Dependent 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.28***
(4.56) (3.90) (3.26) (4.17) (3.36) (2.76) (3.89) (3.48) (2.90) (4.18) (3.38) (2.93)
ID  * ECa 0.50** 0.55** −0.13 0.47** 0.53** −0.33 0.48** 0.53** −0.14 0.50** 0.56** −0.15
(2.54)  (2.52) (0.53) (2.40) (2.29) (0.73) (2.52) (2.18) (0.47) (2.47) (2.16) (0.43)
ID  * DCa −0.09  0.00 0.01 −0.04 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.06 −0.00 0.07 0.13
(0.47) (0.03) (0.04) (0.24) (0.30) (0.59) (0.13) (0.29) (0.21) (0.01) (0.49) (0.51)
Income  Diversity 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.10
(0.58) (0.36) (0.40) (0.29) (0.01) (0.43) (0.46) (0.35) (0.56)
Capitalization −0.29 −0.31 −0.24 −0.22 −0.29 −0.24 −0.23 −0.30 −0.22 −0.21 −0.27 −0.23
(1.33)  (1.60) (1.05) (1.04) (1.46) (1.03) (0.98) (1.42) (1.06) (1.05) (1.45) (1.06)
Operational Inefﬁciency −0.00 0.02 −0.05 −0.08 −0.06 −0.10  −0.10 −0.05 −0.10 −0.08 −0.06 −0.08
(0.00) (0.22) (0.59) (0.88) (0.64) (1.16) (1.15) (0.43) (1.10) (0.84) (0.63) (1.03)
NPL  −0.15** −0.17** −0.14** −0.12* −0.16** −0.12* −0.15* −0.17* −0.14* −0.13* −0.17** −0.11
(1.98)  (2.37) (1.96) (1.90) (1.97) (1.72) (1.91) (1.95) (1.78) (1.95) (2.15) (1.58)
Assets  Growth 0.01 0.02 −0.02
(0.25) (0.43) (0.43)
GDP Growth 0.14* 0.18** 0.20*** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.12* 0.17** 0.18*** 0.15* 0.20*** 0.23***
(1.89) (2.54) (3.56) (2.00) (2.78) (3.48) (1.77) (2.37) (3.29) (1.90) (2.73) (3.46)
Inﬂation 0.04 0.08 0.09* 0.03 0.08 0.12* 0.05 0.09 0.09* 0.03 0.08 0.09
(0.51) (1.46) (1.71) (0.31) (1.30) (1.84) (0.58) (1.35) (1.70) (0.33) (1.32) (1.53)
Long-run effect (ID * EC) 0.74** 0.82** −0.19 0.70** 0.77** −0.45 0.76** 0.83** −0.21 0.77** 0.83** −0.21
Long-run effect (ID * DC) −0.14 0.01 0.02 −0.06 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.07 0.09 −0.00 0.11 0.19
Age  dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Year,  country, size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number  of observations 900  900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900  900
Number  of banks 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Number  of instruments 137 137 137 126 126 126 110 110 110 124 124 124
AR(2)  p-valueb 0.91 0.99 0.88 0.88 0.97 0.86 0.96 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.99 0.83
Hansen  p-valuec 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.32 0.25 0.15 0.43 0.45 0.50
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All coefﬁcients are standardised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a
one-standard deviation change in the  independent variable. The regression model is given in (M.1). The bank- and country-level variables of vectors X and Y are included in
the  regressions but are not displayed in this table. The description of the regression variables is  given in Table 1.  Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard
errors.
a For brevity and comparability, the columns show the results with the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’ and ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks
headquartered in ECs and DCs, and ‘ID’ ∈  {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’} (as given at  the top of each column). Equations in columns (1)–(3) include ‘Assets Growth’ in the list of
bank-level control variables. Equations in columns (4)–(6) include age dummies in the list of bank-level control variables. Equations in columns (7)–(9) exclude ‘Income
Diversity’ from the list of bank-level control variables. Equations in columns (10)–(12) employ re-deﬁned ‘ID’ measures, capturing geographic diversiﬁcation within and
across ﬁve regions, instead of six.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order two in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
estimation, where the diversiﬁcation measures and the bank-level
control variables are lagged by one year to mitigate the possibility
of simultaneity or reverse causality bias. Overall, the results are  in
line with those reported in Table 3 and the main conclusions remain
valid.30
To further explore the sensitivity of our results, we replace our
baseline diversiﬁcation measures with the two Herﬁndahl-type
indices discussed in Section 3.1. The corresponding results, dis-
played in Table 13, conﬁrm that our ﬁndings are indeed due to
the distinction between global and regional dispersion. Speciﬁ-
cally, while the coefﬁcient on ‘ *  EC’ is  positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level in  the regression with ‘Inter-
national Concentration’, it becomes larger in magnitude and highly
30 As noted in Section 3.2, using the system-GMM mitigates most of the endo-
geneity issues since this  methodology is  suitable for independent variables that
are  not strictly exogenous. We  acknowledge that the identiﬁcation can be further
strengthened by using instrumental variable analysis based on external instruments.
However, ﬁnding a valid instrument for internationalization becomes very challeng-
ing  when one considers different types of geographic diversiﬁcation (within and
across regions) and employs data from very different countries, as in our case.
statistically signiﬁcant in  the regression with ‘Regional Concentra-
tion’.
Additional checks are conducted, such as using different clas-
siﬁcations of DCs and ECs,31 employing different instrument
structures, and using alternative measures of institutional devel-
opment and regulatory efﬁciency (for the tests in Sections 4.2 and
4.3) based on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Free-
dom. These additional tests yield similar results and do not change
the inferences drawn (available upon request).
5. Conclusions
The global banking system has now become more heteroge-
neous than ever before due to the increasingly important role  of
banks from emerging markets and the rising trend towards greater
regional activity. The existing literature on the internationaliza-
tion–bank performance debate ignores the locus of geographic
31 For instance, treating South Korea as an  EC based on the MSCI Market Classiﬁ-
cation Framework does  not alter our ﬁndings.
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Table  11
Diversiﬁcation and value: robustness tests (continued).
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
Exclude US banks Exclude Japanese banks Exclude Chinese banks Exclude non-diversiﬁed banks
TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER TOTAL INTRA INTER
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Dependent 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.25** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.28** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.20*
(3.34) (3.52) (2.11) (4.03) (3.36) (2.79) (3.74) (3.15) (2.54) (3.01) (3.28) (1.72)
ID  * ECa 0.45** 0.46** −0.02 0.50** 0.62** −0.23 0.57** 0.55** −0.31 0.43** 0.44** −0.13
(2.43)  (2.07) (0.08) (2.31) (2.32) (0.69) (2.58) (2.15) (0.62) (2.49) (2.24) (0.37)
ID  * DCa −0.23  −0.06 −0.23 −0.02 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.01 −0.08 0.07
(1.18)  (0.38) (0.67) (0.07) (0.52) (0.30) (0.33) (0.60) (0.16) (0.05) (0.43) (0.33)
Income Diversity 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.07
(0.25)  (0.06) (0.25) (0.65) (0.71) (0.67) (0.94) (0.57) (0.91) (0.96) (0.69) (0.44)
Capitalization −0.38 −0.35 −0.44* −0.19 −0.24 −0.18 −0.15 −0.23 −0.20  −0.00 −0.09 0.05
(1.57)  (1.54) (1.67) (0.82) (1.03) (0.84) (0.65) (1.06) (0.85) (0.02) (0.43) (0.27)
Operational Inefﬁciency −0.12  −0.13 −0.14 −0.06 0.00 −0.08 −0.10 −0.08 −0.07  −0.11 −0.06 −0.13
(1.20)  (1.15) (1.27) (0.56) (0.01) (0.83) (1.06) (0.89) (0.80) (1.18) (0.62) (1.47)
NPL  −0.15* −0.19** −0.14 −0.14* −0.17** −0.11* −0.13* −0.16** −0.13** −0.18* −0.23** −0.14
(1.95)  (2.15) (1.61) (1.90) (2.07) (1.79) (1.84) (2.13) (1.98) (1.72) (2.02) (1.59)
Growth 0.14 0.18* 0.18*** 0.13* 0.19** 0.21*** 0.13* 0.17** 0.19*** 0.11 0.14** 0.16**
(1.57) (1.96) (2.76) (1.86) (2.49) (3.27) (1.69) (2.47) (2.98) (1.57) (2.14) (2.52)
Inﬂation 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.11* −0.05 −0.02 0.01
(0.28)  (1.24) (1.37) (0.17) (0.91) (1.47) (0.09) (1.12) (1.65) (0.56) (0.19) (0.06)
Long-run effect (ID * EC) 0.64** 0.67** −0.03 0.76** 0.91** −0.32 0.88*** 0.80** −0.43 0.60** 0.63** −0.16
Long-run effect (ID * DC) −0.32 −0.09 −0.30 −0.03 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.01 −0.12 0.09
Year,  country, size  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 794 794 794 823 823 823 852 852 852 741 741 741
Number of banks 138 138 138 138 138 138 134 134 134 112 112 112
Number of instruments 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 100 100 100
AR(2) p-valueb 0.82 0.94 0.74 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.84
Hansen p-valuec 0.53 0.40 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.67 0.59 0.38
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All  coefﬁcients are  standardised and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for a
one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The  regression model is given in (M.1). The  bank- and country-level variables of vectors X and Y are  included in
the  regressions but are not displayed in this table. The description of the regression variables is given in Table 1.  Equations estimated using Windmeijer WC-robust standard
errors.
a For  brevity and comparability, the columns show the results with the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where ‘EC’ and ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks
headquartered in ECs and DCs,  and ‘ID’  ∈ {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’} (as given at the top of each column). Equations in columns (1)–(3) exclude the US banks. Equations
in  columns (4)–(6) exclude the Japanese banks. Equations in columns (7)–(9) exclude the Chinese banks. Equations in columns (10)–(12) exclude banks with no foreign
subsidiaries in all years.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order  two  in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 1% conﬁdence level.
Table 12
Diversiﬁcation and value: bank ﬁxed effects.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: Bank Fixed Effects. Estimation period: 2004–2013
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
TOTAL 0.54** 0.47*
(2.02) (1.68)
INTRA 0.59*** 0.52**
(2.74) (2.28)
INTER −0.05 −0.04
(0.69) (0.54)
  ID *ECa 0.82** 0.93*** −0.12 0.68* 0.82*** −0.17*
(2.43) (3.48) (0.82) (1.81) (2.85) (1.83)
  ID *DCa −0.07 −0.11 0.01 0.01 −0.10 0.08
(0.43) (0.98) (0.10) (0.03) (1.07) (0.79)
Year  dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784 784
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All  variables are standardised and expressed in ﬁrst differences (). ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’, ‘INTER’, ‘ ID *EC’, ‘  ID
*DC’,  and all bank-level control variables are lagged by  one year to mitigate the possibility of simultaneity or reverse causality bias. The bank- and country-level control
variables (in ﬁrst differences) are included in the regressions but are not displayed in this table. The description of the regression variables is given in  Table 1.  Equations
estimated using robust standard errors.
a In columns with even numbers, the international diversiﬁcation variable ‘ID’ of the previous column is  replaced by  the interaction terms ‘ID*EC’ and ‘ID*DC’, where
‘EC’ and ‘DC’ are binary variables coding banks headquartered in ECs and DCs,  and ‘ID’  ∈  {‘TOTAL’,‘INTRA’,‘INTER’}. Equations in columns (1)–(6) exclude year speciﬁc
effects,  while equations in columns (7)–(12) include year speciﬁc effects.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 10% conﬁdence level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at  the 1% conﬁdence level.
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Table  13
Diversiﬁcation and value: Herﬁndahl-type diversiﬁcation measures.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q.  Method: System Generalized Method of
Moments. Estimation period: 2004–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Dependent 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.32***
(3.45) (4.38) (3.10) (2.86)
International Concentration 0.11
(0.72)
Regional Concentration 0.39
(1.20)
*  ECa 0.39* 0.98***
(1.94) (2.85)
*  DCa −0.02 0.40
(0.12) (1.03)
Long-run effect ()  0.16 0.56
Long-run effect (* EC) 0.60* 1.44***
Long-run effect (* DC) −0.04 0.58
Year, country, size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 900 900 900 900
Number of banks 150 150 150 150
Number of instruments 110 124 110 124
AR(2) p-valueb 0.87 0.91 0.98 0.85
Hansen p-valuec 0.30 0.34 0.18 0.10
Columns report estimated coefﬁcients (|z|-statistics). All  coefﬁcients are standard-
ised  and display how many standard deviations the dependent variable changes for
a  one-standard deviation change in the independent variable. The  regression model
is  given in (M.1), with ‘TOTAL’ and ‘INTRA’ replaced by ‘International Concentration’
and  ‘Regional Concentration’. The bank- and country-level variables of vectors X and
Y  are included in the regressions but are not displayed in this table. The description
of  the regression variables is given in Table 1.  Equations estimated using Windmeijer
WC-robust standard errors.
a In columns with even numbers, the concentration-based diversiﬁcation mea-
sure  ‘’  of the previous column is  replaced by the interaction terms ‘* EC’ and ‘*
DC’,  where ‘EC’ and ‘DC’  are  binary variables coding banks headquartered in ECs and
DCs,  and ‘’  ∈ {‘International Concentration’,‘Regional Concentration’}.
b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order two  in the
ﬁrst-differenced residuals, where H0: no  autocorrelation.
c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0:
over-identifying restrictions are valid.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
diversiﬁcation and fails to appreciate the conditionality of effects
upon home country attributes. Our study ﬁlls this gap by  explor-
ing the valuation impacts of both intra-regional and inter-regional
diversiﬁcation, and by examining whether the resulting effects vary
between banks headquartered in ECs and those headquartered in
DCs. To this end, we consider data from the largest banks across the
world over the period 2004–2013, and employ the system-GMM
estimation technique. Two key results emerge. First, higher levels
of geographic diversiﬁcation are associated with changes in  valua-
tions for EC banks, but not for DC banks. Second, while higher levels
of intra-regional diversiﬁcation lead to value enhancement, higher
levels of inter-regional diversiﬁcation seem to induce a  negative
(but statistically unstable) effect on the valuation of EC banks.
Further analysis sheds light on potential explanations for the
aforementioned ﬁndings. When EC banks diversify across different
regions, they enjoy high proﬁtability gains as they can capitalize on
strategic assets, capabilities and markets outside their home region,
but, at the same time, they are exposed to much higher levels of
risk, leading to ambiguous effects on performance. On the other
hand, when they engage in  a more regionally-concentrated strat-
egy, they can achieve a moderate increase in proﬁtability without
being penalized as much in terms of risk. Through intra-regional
diversiﬁcation, it is  indeed possible to access different markets and
resources embedded in different countries in the region, while, due
to  geographic proximities and institutional and cultural similari-
ties, adaptation costs and risks remain relatively low. As suggested
by Arregle et al. (2009),  although countries continue to  matter,
national markets in  the same region share similarities that decrease
the newness of the problems and the liability of foreignness. Given
that a regional focus is becoming increasingly important in  global
banking, the absence of value gains for DC banks (as observed in
this paper) can be attributed, to some extent, to dismal growth
prospects and costly regulations in the banking markets of these
countries, especially since the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Furthermore, as showcased here, DC banks do not only oper-
ate  in more ﬁnancially and institutionally developed countries,
but are also larger, more mature and earlier-comers to the inter-
nationalization stage compared to EC  banks. Consequently, the
marginal beneﬁts and costs of pursuing further geographic diver-
siﬁcation (either regionally or globally) are much weaker for these
banks.
The expansion of international ﬁnancial institutions has been
particularly strong since the mid-1990s, reﬂecting the sharp
increase in ﬁnancial globalization. Given the concerns about global
banks serving as a  risk transmission channel, the extent of inter-
national diversiﬁcation gains in  banking is critically important
for investors, bankers and policy-makers. The design of  regu-
latory policies and geographic expansion strategies should take
into account that aggregate or total international diversiﬁcation
is  not  a  sufﬁcient indicator of bank multinationality, and that the
value gains from international expansion depend on the banks’
home country set-ups and the locus of international diversiﬁca-
tion, as indicated by the results of this paper. In particular, our
ﬁnding that EC banks’ valuations are  highly responsive to  their
internationalization strategies may  be of help to  policy-makers
in ECs, with regards to  implementing policies aiming at encour-
aging the diversiﬁcation of banking, especially within the same
region.
As outlined above, our paper offers important contributions
to the existing literature, especially with respect to the role of
regional boundaries. However, this is  only one study on this
topic, and, as such, it can be used as the starting point for future
research. Due to  the scope of the current study, we focus on
large banks which can exhibit signiﬁcant within-bank intertem-
poral variation in geographic diversiﬁcation within and across
regions. Hence, our results do not capture all the aspects of
the relationship between geographic diversiﬁcation and perfor-
mance. Extending the sample to include a much larger number
of banks across the world and a longer time period could
enable scholars to examine the bank- and country-level char-
acteristics that determine the propensity to change geographic
scope from domestic to international. Similarly, by consider-
ing a wider sample of banks from ECs, one could explore the
existence of geographic limits in  diversiﬁcation gains within intra-
regional settings, and the role speciﬁc bank attributes play in  that
respect.
Appendix A. Appendix
See Tables A.1–A.3.
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Table  A.1
Descriptive statistics for the main regression variables.
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max
Tobin’s Q (Q) 1042 1.03 0.08 0.86 1.47
ROA 1018 1.03 1.03 −1.84 5.59
Z-score (log) 1012 2.09 1.02 −0.26 5.56
Income Diversity 1018 0.42 0.19 −0.06 0.98
Capitalization 1042 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.28
Operational Inefﬁciency 1018 0.58 0.14 0.22 1.09
NPL 1004 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11
GDP Growth 1042 0.03 0.04 −0.15 0.18
Inﬂation 1042 0.04 0.09 −0.28 1.04
TOTAL  1042 0.80 0.83 0.00 3.18
INTRA 1042 0.50 0.66 0.00 3.18
INTER 1042 0.30 0.42 0.00 1.43
INTRA-Home 1042 0.49 0.71 0.00 3.18
International Concentration 1042 0.40 0.36 0.00 0.96
Regional Concentration 1042 0.39 0.40 0.00 1.00
Geographic Distance (log) 1042 5.79 3.40 0.00 9.37
Language Distance 1042 0.44 0.32 0.00 1.00
Institutional Distance 1042 16.59 15.76 0.00 73.76
Regulatory Distance 1042 15.44 15.43 0.00 77.45
Table A.2
Cross correlation matrix for the main regression variables.
1 2  3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10 11  12  13  14  15  16  17 18
1 Tobin’s Q 1
2 ROA 0.58* 1
3 Z-score 0.03 0.15* 1
4 Income Diversity 0.17* 0.11 −0.16* 1
5 Capitalization 0.29* 0.69* 0.18* 0.06 1
6 Operational Inefﬁciency −0.23* −0.41* −0.34* 0.31* −0.27* 1
7  NPL −0.08 −0.03 −0.18* −0.17* 0.22* −0.07 1
8 GDP Growth 0.19* 0.34* 0.28* −0.06 0.29* −0.23* −0.06 1
9  Inﬂation 0.11 0.31* 0.01 −0.01 0.30* −0.10 0.13* 0.23* 1
10 TOTAL −0.09 −0.20* −0.05 0.06 −0.32* 0.04 −0.10 −0.15* −0.04 1
11  INTRA −0.08 −0.16* −0.07 0.02 −0.27* 0.02 −0.02 −0.16* −0.03 0.87* 1
12  INTER −0.05 −0.13* 0.01 0.09 −0.21* 0.05 −0.17* −0.04 −0.03 0.60* 0.13* 1
13  International Concentration −0.05 −0.17* −0.05 0.03 −0.31* 0.01 −0.10 −0.11 −0.02 0.95* 0.79* 0.63* 1
14  Regional Concentration −0.01 −0.13* −0.06 0.01 −0.17* −0.04 0.05 −0.05 −0.02 0.48* 0.59* 0.00 0.46* 1
15  Geographic Distance 0.10 0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.06 −0.15* 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.54* 0.36* 0.51* 0.62* 0.54* 1
16  Language Distance 0.12 0.08 0.06 −0.11 0.03 −0.18* 0.12 0.13* 0.12* 0.44* 0.39* 0.26* 0.47* 0.58* 0.80 1
17  Institutional Distance 0.02 0.03 0.16* −0.16* 0.02 −0.25* 0.06 0.13* 0.14* 0.23* 0.14* 0.23* 0.26* 0.46* 0.66* 0.64* 1
18 Regulatory Distance 0.06 0.07 0.17* −0.16* 0.05 −0.29* 0.07 0.14* 0.14* 0.24* 0.15* 0.25* 0.27* 0.42* 0.63* 0.61* 0.96* 1
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table A.3
Overview of top 30 most diversiﬁed parent banks.
Bank Name Home Country DC vs EC Total Assetsa Number of
Subsidiaries
Host Countries
Ecobank Transnational
Incorporated
TG EC 8 24  BF, BI,  BJ, CD, CF, CG, CI,  CM, GA, GN,  GW,  KE, LR,  ML, NE,
NG,  RW,  SL, SN, TD, TG, TZ, UG, ZW
Standard Bank Group
Limited
ZA EC 162 18  AO, BW,  CD, GB, GH, KE, LS, LU,  MU,  MW,  MZ,  NA, RU, SZ,
ZA,  ZM
Banco  Santander SA ES DC 1461 19  BE, BO, BR, CH, CL, CO, ES,  GB, IT, MX,  PL, PT, RU, US,  UY, VE
Standard Chartered Plc GB DC 437 17  AU, BW,  CN,  GB, GH, KE, KR, MU,  MY,  NG, TH, TZ, UG,  VN,
ZM
BNP  Paribas FR DC 2516 15  BE, BR, CN, DZ, ES,  FR, IT, LU,  MG,  PL,  RU, TR, UA, US
Société Générale FR DC 1528 26  AR, BR,  CI, CN, CZ, DE,  DZ, FR, GR, HR, MA,  PL, RO, RS, RU, SI,
TN
Bank  of Nova Scotia (The) –
SCOTIABANK
CA DC 668 13  AR, CA, CL, CO, CR,  GB, JM,  MX,  PE,  SV, TT, US
UniCredit SpA IT DC 1223 17  AT, BG, CZ,  DE, HR, IT, LU, PL, RO, RS,  RU,  SI
HSBC  Holdings Plc GB DC 2410 14  AR, BR, CN, EG, FR, GB, MT,  MX,  MY, TR, VN
Deutsche Bank AG DE DC 2668 16  BR, CN, DE, ES, GB,  IT,  LU, MY,  NL, RU, US
Banco  Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria SA
ES DC 745 11  AR, BR, CL, CO, ES, MX,  PT, PY, US, UY, VE
Citigroup Inc US  DC 1857 10 BE, CN, IE, JP, KZ, MX,  MY, PE, US
Commerzbank AG DE DC 758 11  AT, BR, DE, GB, HU, ID, LU, PL, RU
Intesa  Sanpaolo IT DC 864 11  AL, AR, BR, CL, DE, EG, FR, IE, IT,  SI, UY
DnB  ASA NO DC 315 7  DK, LT, LU, LV, NO, PL, RU
Sumitomo  Mitsui Financial
Group, Inc
JP DC 1569 9  BR, CA, CN, GB, ID, JP, US
Credit  Suisse Group AG CH DC 1014 9  CH, DE, FR, GB, IT, LU, MX
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Table A.3 (Continued)
Bank Name Home Country DC vs EC Total Assetsa Number of
Subsidiaries
Host Countries
KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe
SA-KBC Group
BE DC 429 11 BE, CZ,  DE, HU, LU, RS,  SK
OTP  Bank Plc HU EC 46 6 HR, HU, ME, RO, RS, SK
Attijariwafa Bank MA EC 37 6 CG, CI,  FR, GA, ML,  SN
Access Bank Plc NG EC 9 6 CD, GB, GH, RW,  SL, ZM
Shinhan Financial Group KR DC 250 7 CN, DE, JP, KR,  US, VN
FirstRand Limited ZA EC 101 7 LS, MZ,  NA, SZ, ZA, ZM
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial
Group Inc-
Kabushiki Kaisha
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial
Group
JP DC 1824 7 CA, CN, JP, MY,  NL, US
Barclays Plc GB DC 2283 8 EG, ES, GB, KE, US, ZA
Nordea Bank AB (publ) SE DC 731 8 DK, FI, LU, NO, RU, SE
Erste Group Bank AG AT DC 272 11 AT, CZ, HR, RO, RS, UA
Byblos  Bank S.A.L. LB EC 10 5 AM,  BE, CD, SD, SY
United  Bank for Africa Plc NG EC 13 5 BF, CM,  GH,  TZ,  UG
CTBC Financial Holding Co
Ltd
CN  EC 73 5 CA, CN, ID, PH, US
a Median of total assets over the sample period (in billions of US  dollars). Country names are according to ISO 3166-2 classiﬁcation.
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